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In The Federalist Number 52, James Madison1 famously
describes several principles of good government:
In framing a government which is to be administered
by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you
must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control
itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the
primary control on the government; but experience has
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.2
Madison, of course, wrote from experience. As a delegate at the
Constitutional Convention not too many months earlier, he and the
other Framers had continually debated how to design a government
that would control itself. They spent months outlining how the three
branches of the federal government would separate power. They
scrutinized myriad checks and balances that would govern the
interrelationship of the branches. And because of those efforts, the
Constitution they ultimately presented to the American people
included a vast assortment of mechanisms to protect the people’s
liberty—it included “auxiliary precautions.”
One such precaution was the mode of election for Senators,
who would comprise the second branch of Congress. Senators were
to be elected by the legislature of the state they represented.3 This
prescription was the subject of thoughtful, careful debate by the
Framers.
In the course of their debates, the Framers emphasized three
primary arguments for prescribing state legislative election of
Senators: (1) it would further diversify the chambers of this bicameral
Congress, thus decreasing the likelihood of congressional action that
infringed the people’s liberties; (2) the Senators would thereby
1

This paper refers heavily to the arguments written in The Federalist Papers. Typically,
the author of a particular paper is specified, but at times when multiple papers of different
authors are referred to collectively, the author is labeled as Publius. The Federalist Papers
are actually the composite work of three of the Founding Fathers, Alexander Hamilton (who
organized the project), James Madison, and John Jay. See Clinton Rossiter, Introduction to
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, at ix (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). For political reasons, the Papers
at the time were published under the collective pseudonym Publius, see id. at x–xi, thus my
use of that name when referring to multiple papers collectively.
2
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
3
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss2/7

2

Eisinger: Auxiliary Protections

2015

AUXILIARY PROTECTIONS

233

represent the states, which constitute a phenomenally active
constituency for the second branch because of the states’ ability to
gather, process, and distribute information and their natural
inclination to oppose overreaching federal measures; and (3) it would
result in distinguished Senators who were sufficiently independent
from the people such that they could check the volatilities of
democracy. Clearly, the Framers thought things through.
The miracle that was the Constitution4 was accompanied by
yet another miracle, an American people who were open to the same
type of thoughtful debate as the Framers.5 Those who opposed the
Constitution raised a slew of arguments, old and new, against the
document, including its Senate. Proponents made their responses,
and thus the American people witnessed a debate, both live and
written, regarding a government that would change the world. The
American people, too, were convinced of the virtues of the
Constitution, including its auxiliary protection of electing Senators by
state legislatures.
Enter the Progressives. Unlike the Framers or the ratifiers,
members of the Progressive Movement observed problems in the
world around them and myopically marched straight ahead to
implement hasty solutions. They lived in a republic but wanted a
democracy. And one of their number one priorities was to alter the
election mode for Senators—surely things would improve if the
people directly elected their Senators.
Opponents of this proposal raised various counterarguments,
including those that the Founders had made over a century earlier.
But proponents were undeterred. That was a different time, they said.
The Founders did the best they could with what they had, but times
have changed. In the Framers’ grand scheme, state legislative
election for Senators was a hasty afterthought with little to say for it.
The Progressive Movement prevailed: the Seventeenth
Amendment instituted direct election for Senators.6 An auxiliary
protection was eliminated—the results were disastrous.

4
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 230–31 (James Madison) (finding evidence of divine
guidance in the Convention’s result).
5
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing the American people
as in a unique moment in history “to decide the important question, whether societies of men
are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice”).
6
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
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This Note intends to remind readers of the arguments the
founding generation made when they selected state legislative
election for Senators. 7 Part I sets the stage with a brief overview of
the movement that culminated in the Seventeenth Amendment. Part
II presents and analyzes the Founders’ arguments. Part II.A argues
that the Framers chose state legislative election for Senators because
they intended a bicameral Congress with distinct houses. Part II.B
argues that they compromised to let Senators represent states and,
having done so, recognized that state legislative elections would
provide Senators with an optimal constituency—the States. Part II.C
argues that state legislative election was implemented as a means of
producing distinguished Senators who were independent from the
people such that they could check the people in moments of
temporary error. Each of these subsections also provides a brief
assessment of the historical arguments from a modern view. Part III
concludes with a general warning to respect the wise, careful
planning the Framers employed in designing America’s government.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PASSAGE OF THE SEVENTEENTH
AMENDMENT

The first proposal for direct election of senators came in 1826
(from a House Representative, obviously), and over the next few
decades, similar proposals surfaced now and then.8 By the mid7

As the reader is likely aware, the legal world has been embroiled in a decades-long
debate over the proper methods for ascertaining legislative intent. Textualists seem to have
secured a firm foothold regarding the proper starting point for such an inquiry—the text
itself. See, e.g., Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1264 (2011). But jurists’
viewpoints on a text’s ambiguity (and thus the need to proceed to extrinsic evidence) differ,
and the legitimacy of legislative history is in question. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 567–72 (2005). As one who is persuaded by the
textualist argument, I feel it necessary to explain a Note that delves heavily into historical
debates and writings. And the explanation is simple: the Constitution’s text was perfectly
clear about the mode of election the Framers desired. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The
Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by
the Legislature thereof . . . .” (emphasis added)), amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
Indeed, it was Progressives’ recognition of the text’s clarity that led them to amend the text
itself. This Note, then, need not prove the meaning of the Framers’ text. Instead, it focuses
on the arguments that convinced the Framers and ratifiers to adopt the text they did.
8
See RALPH A. ROSSUM, FEDERALISM, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE SEVENTEENTH
AMENDMENT 194–95 (2001). This section barely scratches the surface of the history of the
Seventeenth Amendment. For a more detailed review, see generally GEORGE H. HAYNES,
THE ELECTION OF SENATORS (1906); C.H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY
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nineteenth century, Andrew Johnson was proposing direct election as
a Representative, and within twenty years, as President.9 And by the
end of that century, proposals for direct election were abundant.10
Despite the growing momentum, though, no proposed amendment
could garner the requisite two-thirds majority in the Senate.11 In May
of 1912, the Senate gave in,12 and one year later, the states had
ratified the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution.13
The long road to the Seventeenth Amendment included a
great deal of debate about the state legislatures’ election of Senators
and the advantages and disadvantages of that system.
First,14 proponents of the Amendment argued that Senators
were unresponsive to the people.15 Senators depended less on their
popularity with the people than with the state legislators.16 Thus,
when the people called for certain changes important to them,
Senators were not always attentive.17 Indeed, some Senators were
not even responsive to the desires of the state legislature.18 These
conflicting interests between the Senate and House dampened
Congress’s ability to pass necessary laws.19
(1995); ROSSUM, supra, at 181–218.
9
See ROSSUM, supra note 8, at 195.
10
See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 137.
11
See, e.g., ROSSUM, supra note 8, at 210 (describing the defeat of the last failed proposal,
that of the 61st Congress).
12
See id. at 214.
13
See id. at 218.
14
For responses to the objections in this paragraph, see HOEBEKE, supra note 8; infra
Sections II.A.2 and II.C.
15
See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 191.
16
See HAYNES, supra note 8, at 168 (writing that a Senator’s election chances then
depended on their ability to “negotiate” with the legislature).
17
See id. at 167 (“Almost inevitably it results that [a Senator] renounces any attempt to
keep in sensitive touch with the people.”).
18
See id. at 168.
19
See id. at 155 (describing the mode of senatorial election as a roadblock for
“democracy’s consistent advance”). An important question regarding this objection is, “
‘Necessary’ from whose point of view?” If “necessary” to the people, then the objection has
some traction (although it may not be persuasive, see infra note 137). But if “necessary” to
special interest groups, then the objection is unfounded. Yet in a brilliant article, Todd
Zywicki makes a strong case for just that. See Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special
Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007
(1994). In a classic case of Baptists and bootleggers, see Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and
Baptists—The Education of a Regulator Economist, 7 VIEWPOINT 12, 13 (1983), available at
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1983/5/v7n3-3.pdf, special
interests were the impetus for, and greatest beneficiaries of, the Seventeenth Amendment,
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Second, the reputation of Senate elections was tarnished by
incidents of bribery and corruption.20 This created doubts as to the
efficacy of state legislative elections in electing distinguished,
upstanding Senators.21
Third, deadlock in state legislatures on election of Senators
had resulted in vacancies in the United States Senate.22 A switch to
direct election would mean hundreds of thousands, or even millions,
of voters choosing between candidates, making the likelihood of
deadlock infinitesimally small.23
Finally, electing Senators by state legislatures was an
antiquated concept that had been little more than an afterthought for
the Founders.24 They were, in fact, “comparatively indifferent as to
the means or manner of election.”25 Guided by the lessons of history,
the people now know how to design Congress better, and direct
election is the right option.26
Each of the objections above includes a footnote referencing a
subsection of this Note and/or other sources that have provided
responses thereto, except the last—that the Founders were
“indifferent” toward the mode of election for Senators. If this Note
succeeds in convincing the reader of anything, I hope it will be that
this final rationale was totally and utterly wrong. 27
see Zywicki, supra, at 1054.
20
HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 91–94.
21
See HAYNES, supra note 8, at 165–66. For responses to this objection, see HOEBEKE,
supra note 8, at 94–97 (demonstrating the overblown nature of the perception of corruption);
infra Section II.C.3 (describing the Senate’s reputation as a House of distinguished
characters).
22
See ROSSUM, supra note 8, at 183–90. For a discussion of why Congress, not the states,
was to blame for this circumstance, see id. at 183–84.
23
See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 90.
24
See 46 CONG. REC. 1979 (1911) (statement of Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge) (arguing
emphatically that the Framers were not aware “they were destroying the popular quality of
their work” in designing the mode of election for the President and Senate).
25
William A. Harris, The Election of Senators by the People, 52 INDEP. 1291, 1291
(1900).
26
S. REP. NO. 61-961, at 4 (1911) in 1 CONGRESSIONAL EDITION: VOLUME 6078, at 3
(1911). (“In what possible way could the mode of choosing Senators change his relations to
the State or the people thereof?”).
27
It is worth noting that the anti-Constitutional movement of the founding generation, the
Anti-Federalists, would also have rejected the Seventeenth Amendment. Their primary
philosophical dispute was whether a republican government could govern adequately a
nation of such size. See HERBERT J. STORING, 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 15
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); id. at 15 n.*4 (listing myriad examples from the Anti-
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THE FRAMERS AND RATIFIERS’ PURPOSE

In the heat of the moment, the proponents of the Seventeenth
Amendment lost sight of the purpose behind the Senate’s mode of
election. That isn’t to say they lost sight of the founding generation’s
intent. They knew quite clearly that they were departing from the
original design of the Framers. What they lost sight of was the
purpose of that design, the reasons it was chosen. Their error was to
presume they saw the whole picture and then think themselves wiser
than their forbearers.
The Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution hand-selected
state legislatures as the electing bodies of Senators.28 This section
explains in detail their purpose for doing so. Each section is
generally organized by: (1) a brief introduction to the topic(s), (2)
within a topic or sub-topic, the debates that occurred at the
Convention, accompanied by analysis, (3) within the same topic or
sub-topic, the debates that occurred among the ratifiers of the text,
and (4) a modern assessment of the historical arguments.
A.

The Concurrence of Two Distinct Bodies

In his study of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville
observed a striking difference between the members of the 1830
Congress’s two houses.
Of the Representatives, Tocqueville
described, “you feel yourself struck by the vulgar aspect of this great
assembly.”29 He remarked at the lack of fame and prominence
Federalist literature); Cecelia M. Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the
Nature of Representative Government, 12 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 6 (1955). That philosophy
stemmed from Montesquieu’s assertion that republics only work for small jurisdictions, and
that larger areas require a monarchy or despot. See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS
124–26 (Anne M. Cohler et al eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748). Thus,
Anti-Federalists would have rejected outright the Seventeenth Amendment’s
democratization of government on a national scale. See Kenyon, supra, at 43 (concluding
that the Anti-Federalists never called for direct election of Senators because they lacked the
faith to “extend their principles nation-wide”).
28
See Todd Zywicki, Repeal the Seventeenth Amendment and Restore the Founders’
Design,
12
ENGAGE
88,
90
(2011),
available
at
http://www.fedsoc.org/publications/detail/ramifications-of-repealing-the-17th-amendment (“[T]he authors
of The Federalist Papers and others believed that election of the Senate by state legislatures
would be both a necessary and sufficient condition for . . . limiting the federal
government.”).
29
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 191 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba
Winthrop eds., Univ. of Chicago 2000) (1835).
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associated with these men, and even indulged in a rumor that some
Representatives did not “know how to write correctly.”30 Yet “[t]wo
steps away,” Tocqueville describes, “is the chamber of the Senate,
whose narrow precincts enclose a large portion of the celebrities of
America.”31
Unlike their House counterparts, Senators were
“eloquent,” “distinguished,” and “well-known.”32 And “[a]ll the
words that issue from this assembly would do honor to the greatest
parliamentary debates of Europe.”33
The “enormous difference” between these two houses led
Tocqueville to ask why.34 The question was particularly puzzling
because, unlike some European legislatures (such as the Houses of
Commons and Lords), the ultimate electorates of both bodies enjoyed
universal suffrage.35 Tocqueville concluded, “I see only a single fact
that explains it: the election that produces the House of
Representatives is direct; that from which the Senate emanates is
subject to two stages.”36
The circumstances observed by Tocqueville were no
accident—America’s Founding Fathers intended for the houses of
Congress to be as distinct as possible.37 In this way, legislative
structure would reduce the potential for laws that infringed on the
people’s rights. And mode of election was one of several ways to
ensure the houses’ distinctive characteristics.38
This section
demonstrates the Framers’ intent for distinct Congressional houses by
sketching the historical context and by analyzing the arguments of the
Framers and ratifiers.

30

Id.
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 29, at 191–92.
35
Id. at 192.
36
Id.
37
See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 173.
38
Beyond the scope of this paper are other ways the Framers ensured that the House and
Senate would be distinct. These included different candidacy qualifications, term lengths,
membership numerosity, and district size (note that even those opposed to election by state
legislatures favored larger Senatorial districts than those of the House, see, e.g., Notes of
James Madison (June 7, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
154 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS] (“[Mr. James
Wilson] was for an election by the people in large districts . . . .”)). Compare U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2, with id. § 3.
31
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Historical Context

At the close of his career as a historian of American law’s
British roots, J.R. Pole observed that, although America had imported
a certain “ideology” from British government, American institutional
structures were necessarily informed by the “accumulated effects” of
America’s own “institutional memories and habits.”39 This insight is
paramount here. It turns out that the Framers and ratifiers did not
often debate (at least compared to other hot-button topics) the need to
make the House and Senate distinct. It was not, apparently, a
contentious point. History explains why: The Framers and ratifiers
took distinctness for granted because they had never known
bicameralism to mean anything else.
British government provides our starting point. Parliament
was and is a bicameral legislature divided into the House of
Commons and House of Lords.40 As the name suggests, the House of
Commons originated to represent freemen who lacked noble
ancestry.41 And the House of Lords had long been comprised of the
Lords Temporal, i.e. the barons, and the Lords Spiritual, i.e. the
clergy.42 Although the distinctive divide between these houses was
largely a product of history (rather than theory), the Framers knew
well its virtues.43
39
J. R. POLE, CONTRACT & CONSENT: REPRESENTATION AND THE JURY IN ANGLO–
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 154-55 (2010).
40
See id. at 154.
41
MOYRA GRANT, THE UK PARLIAMENT 2 (2009). Initially, the term “commons” referred,
not to a parliamentary house, but a group of knights who joined King Henry III’s Great
Council synchronous with the King’s extension of the tax burden to freemen. Id.; J.R.
MADDICOTT, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT, 924-1327, at 187, 199 (2010).
During that first century or so, whenever the King summoned the commons, he would make
his wishes known and then quickly dismiss them. GRANT, supra. The commoners began the
practice of gathering in a second chamber (hence, bicameralism) and, eventually, making
their own demands of the King in exchange for their consent to taxes. Id. By the midfourteenth century, Britain formalized the authority of both the Lords and Commons,
requiring the consent of both (and the Crown) for any law. Id. at 3. Charles Pinckney
surveyed this history when he commenced the Convention’s debate on senatorial elections.
See Notes of James Madison (June 25, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at
399–400.
42
GRANT, supra note 41. The Lords, which predated Commons, initially was comprised
of the King’s advisors, referred to as a Great Council. Id. Although the bargaining power of
the Lords had long necessitated their consent to the King’s edicts, their authority too was
first formally legitimized in the mid-fifteenth century. Id. at 3.
43
See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE
CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 136 (2012) (suggesting that the composition of Parliament, the
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The Framers had also read the political philosophers of the
Enlightenment. Montesquieu advocated for a separation of the
nobles and the people into separate legislative chambers.44 In this
way, he argued, each could represent “separate views and interests”
and provide a check on one another.45 Hume recognized the
importance of the House of Lords in representing the nobility’s
interests, but he viewed the institution as too weak to provide an
adequate counterbalance to the power of the House of Commons.46
And although Locke was seemingly indifferent toward dividing a
legislature into separate chambers,47 he was adamant that the
legislature represent society’s wide spectrum of distinct interests.48
House of Commons and House of Lords, informed the Framers’ view of bicameralism).
Perhaps the most famous evidence of this deep awareness is John Adams’ response to the
criticisms of Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot. In 1785, Turgot wrote to Dr. Richard Price, a
known supporter of American independence, and criticized American state governments for
dividing powers among branches.
See Letter from Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot,
Comptroller of the Finance in France, to Dr. Price (Mar. 22, 1778), reprinted in HONORÉGABRIEL DE RIQUETTI, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE ORDER OF CINCINATTUS (Samuel Romilly
trans., 1785). Turgot’s stance was that this division was an impetuous imitation of British
governmental structure rendered unnecessary by the lack of a monarch. Id. He proposed a
unicameral legislature as a superior alternative. See id. (questioning the states’ decision to
not consolidate authority into one body). In response, John Adams published his multivolume treatise, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of
America, against the Attack of M. Turgot in His Letter to Dr. Price, Dated the TwentySecond Day of March, 1778. JOHN ADAMS, 1 A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AGAINST THE ATTACK OF M. TURGOT IN
HIS LETTER TO DR. PRICE, DATED THE TWENTY-SECOND DAY OF MARCH, 1778, 3–4 (3d ed.
1797). Adams argued that Turgot was in error, id., and, in the words of J.R. Pole,
“ransacked ancient history and the Old World to prove that true republican principles had
never been safe, and had never lasted long, without the resort of a second chamber.” POLE,
supra note 39, at 169.
44
MONTESQUIEU, supra note 27, at 159-60.
45
Id. Publius never cites Montesquieu for this particular proposition (again, historically,
the idea of distinct bodies was not controversial) but does for, among others, the concept of
the separation of powers. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301–03 (James Madison).
46
See DAVID HUME, ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY 44 (Oxford Univ. Press
1963) (1741). Publius was certainly familiar with Hume’s writings. See THE FEDERALIST
NO. 85, at 527 (Alexander Hamilton).
47
See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 159 163 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale
Univ. Press 2003) (1690) (referring to the legislative power “whether placed in one or more”
houses).
48
See id. at 164 (“[I]n well ordered commonwealths, where the good of the whole is so
considered, as it ought, the legislative power is put into the hands of divers [sic] persons . . .
.”). Locke certainly seemed to have no qualms with Parliament’s bicameral choice. See id.
(describing the legislative body of “divers [sic] persons” as potentially sharing the legislative
power). But his indifference contrasts starkly with Montesquieu, who argued that combining
the representatives of the nobles and those of the people would swallow the interests of the
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The governments of colonies provide further context. During
the decades immediately preceding the Revolutionary War,49 eleven
of the thirteen original colonies had bicameral legislatures (Delaware
and Pennsylvania did not).50 The lower houses were modeled after
the House of Commons and elected by the people.51
The
composition of the upper houses (called “councils”) varied depending
on the particular colony’s categorization, which might be royal,
proprietary, or popular.52 Two of the three popular colonies
(Connecticut and Rhode Island) elected their councils by popular
vote, but the third colony’s (Massachusetts’) council was elected by
its lower house, and all of the remaining colonies’ councils were
appointed by the King or proprietor respectively.53 And regardless of
the mode of election, all colonial councils constituted an aristocratic
body that defended the royal interests.54
After declaring independence, most states reassessed their
governmental structure, including the legislature.55 After a small
shuffle on the cameral front, eleven of the thirteen states moved
forward with bicameral legislatures.56 But of course, the councils
(some now renamed as “senates”)57 could no longer depend upon
nobles (who comprise, almost by definition, a minority). MONTESQUIEU, supra note 27, at
160.
49
Focusing on these decades accomplishes two purposes. First, it highlights the
governments with which the founding generation was most familiar. Second, it sets aside
the complexities associated with those less relevant years, including Pennsylvania’s
transition to unicameralism in 1701, PEVERILL SQUIRE, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN
LEGISLATURES 23 (2012), Georgia’s transition from unicameralism in 1755, id., and the
annexation of various colonies into what we now refer to as the “thirteen original colonies,”
id. at 13 tbl.2.1 & nn.d–e.
50
Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens’ Song of the
Seventeenth Amendment, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 507 (1997); see also SQUIRE, supra note 49
(“[B]icameralism . . . became the established norm in the colonies.”).
51
Bybee, supra note 50.
52
See id.
53
Id.; see also SQUIRE, supra note 49, at 13 tbl.2.1.
54
Bybee, supra note 50.
55
See SQUIRE, supra note 49, at 83 (explaining that eleven of the thirteen colonies chose
to draft new constitutions, with Connecticut and Rhode Island continuing under their popular
charters).
56
Id. at 84 tbl.3.1. Delaware transitioned to a bicameral legislature, and Georgia
transitioned (back) to a unicameral legislature. Id. at 84 tbl.3.1, 86. Although the large
majority of states simply retained their legislature’s bicameralism, Pole emphasizes that
these constitutional designs were the product of conscious decisions based on experience.
POLE, supra note 39, at 160.
57
SQUIRE, supra note 49, at 84 tbl.3.1.
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royal appointment for their membership, and the royalty no longer
provided a constituency for senators.
The various states
accommodated this shift differently. Georgia reversed course and
implemented a unicameral legislature.58 Several states retained their
bicameral legislatures but restricted the popular electorate of the
upper house through certain property requirements,59 an attempt to
recreate the natural class division the royalty previously constituted.60
Some states replaced the royal constituency with other government
bodies. South Carolina’s lower house began to elect its upper
house’s members.61 Most uniquely of all, Maryland elected its
senators through an electoral college.62 The college was comprised
of two electors from each county and one elector each from
Baltimore and Annapolis.63 The college then elected fifteen senators,
with a mandate that nine reside on the western shore of the
Chesapeake Bay and six on the eastern shore.64
58
Id. Although according to Noah Webster, a proponent of the Constitution, the people of
the state quickly discovered the “inconveniences” of that shift. A CITIZEN OF AMERICA
(PSEUDONYM OF NOAH WEBSTER), AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1787), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 134
(Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter 1 DEBATE].
59
HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 38. The five states were Massachusetts, New York, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, and North Carolina. Id.
60
See POLE, supra note 39, at 159 (“[The upper house] had been a much weaker branch of
the government than either the governor or the assembly; it had not established any very
distinct legitimation for its existence in a society formally lacking in social differentiation.”);
id. at 161 (“Constitution makers were deliberately striving to use existing institutional forms
for the representation of social elements not far removed from class interests, which had
never been previously defined as fitting into distinct institutions . . . .”). Because land was so
abundant, property ownership failed to create any meaningful difference between these state
houses. See HOEBEKE, supra note 8; POLE, supra note 39, at 163. The Framers recognized
that failure and frequently cited Massachusetts’ troubles to evidence the evils of popular
passions. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 448 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that
the rebellious attitude exhibited in Shays’ Rebellion “embrace[d] a large proportion of the
community” and that one “might expect to see the representation of the people tainted with
the same spirit”).
61
SQUIRE, supra note 49, at 82.
62
See
MD.
CONST.
OF
1776,
art.
XIV,
XV,
available
at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ma02.asp.
63
Id. art. XIV.
64
Id. art. XV. Senators served five-year terms. See id. art. XIV (providing that senatorial
elections take place every fifth year). Maryland’s senate became a model for its US
counterpart. See Notes of James Madison (June 12, 1787), infra note 292, at 218–19
(statement of James Madison) (recognizing the similarity between the Maryland Senate and
the proposed US Senate and recommending that the Committee continue to follow
Maryland’s example); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 242 (James Madison) (describing
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Lastly, it is important to keep in mind the national
government structure the Framers chose to leave behind—the
Confederation.
The Articles of Confederation prescribed a
government for member states (not people).65 Accordingly, the
Articles provided for state legislatures to direct the selection of
representatives in the Continental Congress.66 And not surprisingly
at all, that Congress was unicameral.67
In sum, the founding generation grew up among institutions
and theories that treated bicameralism as sensible only if the resultant
houses were distinct from each other. This context informs the
distinguishing characteristics they chose for the United States Senate.
2.

Founders’ Arguments

As explained above, the concept of distinct houses in a
bicameral legislature was not terribly controversial among the
Founders.68 The arguments tended to regard, first, whether the
national legislature ought to be bicameral at all and, second, if so, to
what degree the distinction ought to be pressed.
some similarities); THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 388 (James Madison); infra notes 322–329
and accompanying text. Admittedly, Delaware and Virginia did not assign distinct
constituencies to the different houses of their bicameral legislatures. HOEBEKE, supra note 8,
at 38. But by virtue of their exceptional nature, these states tend to prove the rule. What’s
more, these states did differentiate their houses by number (and, thus, district size) as well as
term length. See SQUIRE, supra note 49, at 84 tbl.3.1. Indeed, to the degree their legislative
houses were similar, these states only became an example of how a legislature ought not to
be designed. See POLE, supra note 39, at 168 (“Thomas Jefferson and James Madison
agreed in finding the two houses in their own state of Virginia too homogeneous with each
other . . . .”).
65
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, pmbl. (prefacing the Articles as “[b]etween the
states”); id. art. V (referring to Congress’s convening as a “meeting of the States”); see also
POLE, supra note 39, at 165 (“The old Congress was in essence a meeting of sovereign states
. . . .”).
66
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. V, para. 1.
67
Id. More striking still, but beyond the scope of this paper, was that Congress
constituted the national government in its entirety. The Articles provided for neither an
executive nor courts. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781; see also THE FEDERALIST
NO. 38, at 238 (James Madison) (“Is it improper and unsafe to intermix the different powers
of government in the same body of men? Congress, a single body of men, are the sole
depositary of all the federal powers.”).
68
Even a staunch advocate of unicameralism like Republicus acknowledged that
bicameralism, if accepted, requires distinctness between the chambers. See Republicus,
Essay, KY. GAZETTE (Lexington), Feb. 16, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 164 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (writing that “no man” would support a
second chamber composed of “identical” legislators).
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Although we now take our bicameral Congress for granted,
the matter was hardly settled when the Constitutional Convention
delegates convened in 1787. Recall that the delegates’ commission
was to revise the Articles of Confederation,69 and that the Articles
already provided for a unicameral legislature composed of state
representatives.70 Indeed, the New Jersey Plan, proposed three weeks
into the Convention, suggested that Congress retain its unicameral
nature but be granted additional powers.71 Proponents argued
(publicly) that their alternative was more amenable to the will of the
people.72 The people, they claimed, had no issue with Congress’s
structure, only its inefficacy, and the remedy for the latter was
augmented power.73 To meddle with the structure by dividing the
legislature into two branches was unnecessary because (1) the
passions of political parties were absent at the national level, thus
obviating the need for a check on those passions, and (2) if any check
was needed, the state representatives themselves provided it.74 If the
reasoning appears weak, it is.75 The proponents’ real concern was
preserving state sovereignty through per-state Congressional voting.76
69
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 247–48 (James Madison). See generally ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XIII (providing for amendments of the Articles).
70
See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
71
See Notes of James Madison (June 15, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38,
at 242–45.
72
See id. at 251 (stating that the people were not complaining about Congress but only
wished it to have more power).
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
As to the first point, the Framers generally were shortsighted in ignoring the potential
for national political parties. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of
Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2320 (2006) (“[T]he Framers had attempted
to design a ‘Constitution Against Parties.’ But the futility of this effort quickly became
apparent.” (footnote omitted)). But as to the second point, suggesting that a governmental
branch is its own best check, borders on the absurd (indicating the New Jersey Plan’s
proponents were probably making any argument that came to mind in an attempt to preserve
state power). The argument conflates the concern that any particular state might accumulate
too much power, in which case the other states could provide a check, with Congress’s
accumulating too much power, in which case its own members necessarily lacked such a
check. Cf. Notes of James Madison (June 19, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note
38, at 317–18 (detailing instances of the states’ infringements on one another’s sovereignty
under the Articles of Confederation).
76
See Notes of James Madison (June 15, 1787), supra note 71, at 251 (recounting the
small states’ prior hesitancy in joining the Confederation and their ultimate agreement on
condition of equal sovereignty in Congress). Private communications provide yet greater
evidence that state sovereignty was the true issue. See id. at 242 n.* (John Dickinson, of
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Nonetheless, the transition toward bicameralism was accepted
rather quickly once the Convention began. The first step towards
acceptance actually preceded the Convention’s commencement:
while waiting for other delegates to arrive, Madison and his fellow
Virginians prepared fifteen resolutions for the national government.77
And one of those fifteen proposed a bicameral legislature in which
the people elected a House of Representatives, and the House in turn
elected the Senate.78 Virginia proposed its Virginia Plan as soon as
the Convention had settled on some internal rules,79 and by thus
seizing the agenda, the Virginians finessed their fellow delegates into
a summer of debates that revolved around those fifteen resolutions.80
The fight for bicameralism depended on more than seizing the
agenda. The Plan benefitted greatly from the endorsement of some of
the Convention’s stars, most notably George Washington and
Benjamin Franklin.81 Moreover, these men were convinced by the
Delaware, to Madison at the time of the New Jersey Plan’s proposal: “[Y]ou see the
consequence of pushing things too far. Some of the members from the small States wish for
two branches in the General Legislature . . . ; but we would sooner submit to a foreign
power, than submit to be deprived of an equality of suffrage, in both branches of the
legislature . . . .”).
77
DAVID O. STEWART, THE SUMMER OF 1787, at 37–38, 52–53 (2007).
78
Notes of James Madison (May 29, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at
20 (Fourth Resolution).
79
STEWART, supra note 77, at 50–52.
80
For the next two weeks, literally every debate regarded the Virginia Plan because the
delegates reconstituted as a Committee of the Whole, a parliamentary fiction comprised of
the same delegates but geared toward discussion, solely to consider the Plan and make
recommendations (to themselves) for consideration when they again sat as the Convention.
See STEWART, supra note 77, at 53–54. But even when the Convention sat again, it had to
consider the Committee’s recommendations, and it largely did so for the balance of the
summer. See, e.g., Journal (June 25, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 395
(documenting that the Convention voted to accept the fourth resolution of the Virginia Plan
as found in the Committee of the Whole’s report).
81
See, e.g., STEWART, supra note 77, at 37–38 (including Washington among the
Virginians who drafted the Plan). Although Franklin himself preferred a unicameral
legislature, see Notes of James Madison (May 31, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra
note 38, at 48, his greater objective was to see that the Convention draft a successful
proposal, see id. at 111–12 (reporting Franklin’s proposed “Great Compromise”), and for
strong evidence that Franklin considered the ultimate result a success, see K. [a pseudonym
for Benjamin Franklin], Letter to the Editor, FEDERAL GAZETTE (Phila.), Apr. 8, 1788, in 2
THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 401–05 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter 2
DEBATE]. James Madison, Goeverneur Morris, and James Wilson were also supportive stars
(indeed, Wilson instigated the Three-Fifths-Clause Compromise in an attempt to succeed in
transforming the federal government), though of somewhat lesser statures. See Notes of
James Madison (June 19, 1787), supra note 38, at 314–22 (recording Madison’s lengthy
attack on the New Jersey Plan and defense of the Virginia alternative); Notes of James
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arguments. James Wilson summarized those arguments in his
passionate defense of the Virginia Plan: “If the Legislative authority
be not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stability; and it can
only be restrained by dividing it within itself, into distinct and
independent branches. In a single house there is no check . . . .”82
The Virginia Plan,83 and bicameralism,84 triumphed at the
Convention.
During the period of ratification, critics of the Convention’s
proposal largely ignored the question of bicameralism.85 Indeed, in
Madison (May 30, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 33 (noting that Morris
seconded the motion to begin consideration of the Virginia Plan’s first three proposals);
Notes of James Madison (June 16, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 252–
55 (recording Wilson’s floor speech in which he compared the two Plans in an effort to
demonstrate the Virginia Plan’s superiority). Alexander Hamilton rounded out the
delegates’ household names; his infamous, day-long Convention speech railed against the
Virginia Plan (as well as the New Jersey Plan), but only because he found that it failed to go
far enough—he proposed the British model as the “best in the world.” Notes of James
Madison (June 18, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 288; see also id. at
291 (recording Hamilton’s proposed government structure, which began with dividing the
legislative power into two bodies).
82
Notes of James Madison (June 16, 1787), supra note 38, at 254.
83
Journal (June 19, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 313 (reporting that
the Committee of the Whole voted to recommend the Virginia Plan over the New Jersey
Plan by a count of 7-3, with 1 divided).
84
Journal (May 31, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 45–46. The
Convention’s ultimate vote on the question of bicameralism broke down as 9-2, Journal
(June 25, 1787), supra note 80, at 395, with Virginia and Pennsylvania against, see infra
note 111.
85
See, e.g., Luther Martin, “The Genuine Information” I, MD. GAZETTE (Balt.), Dec. 28,
1787, reprinted in 1 DEBATE, supra note 58, at 636 (criticizing Committee’s
recommendation of proportional representation in both branches, but making no comment on
creating two branches); Samuel Spencer, Speech Regarding the Powers of Senate at the
North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 28, 1788), in 2 DEBATE, supra note 81, at 879–81
(acknowledging the Senate as a second branch of the legislature and criticizing, instead, its
shared executive power with the President in appointing officers). Compare Melancton
Smith & Alexander Hamilton, Debate Regarding Representation, Aristocracy, and Interests
at the New York Ratifying Convention (June 21, 1788), in 2 DEBATE, supra note 81, at 772
(Hamilton: arguing that the division of the legislature into separate houses aids in preserving
the people’s liberty), with id. at 774 (Smith: responding to Hamilton’s federalism argument
but making no comment on the point of bicameralism). Many Anti-Federalists were
specifically in favor of bicameralism. See, e.g., A FEDERAL REPUBLICAN (1787), reprinted in
3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 70 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); Brutus, Essay XVI,
N.Y. JOURNAL, Apr. 10, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 287–88
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter Brutus XVI]; Letter XI from the Federal Farmer to
the Republican (Jan. 10, 1788) [hereinafter Federal Farmer XI], in An Additional Number of
Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican Leading to a Fair Examination of the
System of Government Proposed by the Late Convention; To Several Essential and
Necessary Alternations in It; And Calculated to Illustrate and Support the Principles and
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his immensely influential pamphlet An Examination into the Leading
Principles of the Federal Constitution, Noah Webster wrote that
bicameralism “ha[d] so many advocates in America, that it needs not
any vindication.”86 But this apparent concession did not stop
proponents of the Constitution from extolling bicameralism’s virtues.
Webster himself went on to argue that, in separating the two
chambers, bicameralism effectively isolates whatever particular
passion or influence might seize one or the other body.87 And if that
passion results in a bill, the uninfluenced branch can check the
measure by voting it down.88 This point was echoed forcefully in a
successive publication, The Federalist, the influence of which has
become timeless: “In republican government, the legislative authority
necessarily predominates. The remedy for the inconveniency is to
divide the legislature into different branches . . . .”89 Another
Positions Laid Down in the Preceding Letters (1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, supra, at 287–88. But see Republicus, supra note 68, at 164–65 (arguing that a
unicameral legislature is superior because it fills its role about as well as a bicameral one but
with far less cost and inconsistency); Luther Martin, The Genuine Information Delivered to
the Legislature of the State of Maryland Relative to the Proceedings of the General
Convention Lately Held at Philadelphia, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST , supra, at
44–45 (arguing that only the states should be represented in the federal government, making
only one house necessary).
86
A CITIZEN OF AMERICA, supra note 58, at 130; see also id. at 147 (“Luckily this
objection has no advocates but in Pennsylvania; and even here their number is dwindling. . . .
The division of the legislature . . . will be deemed, by nineteen-twentieths of the Americans,
one of the principal excellencies of the constitution.”).
87
See id. at 131–32; see also id. at 133–34 (contrasting the superior governance of
Maryland and Connecticut, the legislatures of which were bicameral, with those of
Pennsylvania, the legislature of which was unicameral).
88
Id. at 131; see also Benjamin Rush, Extract of a Letter from Dr. Rush, of Philadelphia,
Lately Received by Gentleman [David Ramsay] of This City, COLUMBIAN HERALD
(Charleston), Apr. 19, 1788, reprinted in 2 DEBATE, supra note 81, at 417–18 (“I have the
same opinion with the antifederalists of the danger of trusting arbitrary power to any single
body of men; but no such power will be committed to our new rulers. Neither the house of
representatives, [nor] the senate . . . can perform a single legislative act by themselves.”);
Simeon Baldwin, Speech at New Haven (July 4, 1788), in 2 DEBATE, supra note 81, at 521
(praising the Congress as a “most perfect legislature” that possessed “all those checks which
are necessary” to ensure “due deliberation”). The argument is reminiscent of James
Wilson’s defense of the Virginia Plan at the Convention, see supra text accompanying note
82, which Wilson himself renewed while supporting Pennsylvania’s ratification, see James
Wilson, Speech in Response to William Findley at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention
(Dec. 1, 1787), in 1 DEBATE, supra note 58, at 823 [hereinafter Wilson’s Response] (“[T]he
most useful restraint upon the legislature, because it operates constantly, arises from the
division of its power, among two branches . . . .”); see also id. at 824.
89
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 2, at 322; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra
note 64, at 386 (“[T]he danger [of representatives betraying the people] will be evidently
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argument that began to surface was that, assuming (as proponents
were happy to do) that Congress would have a House that answered
frequently to the people, a steadier second branch was necessary to
infuse Congress with the benefits of experience, custom, and
professionalism.90 Such steadiness was of particular importance for
maintaining foreign relations,91 an area in which the Confederation
currently was failing miserably.92
Although the debate over making the legislature bicameral
was contentious, the proponents of bicameralism were the clear
victors. Among these proponents, though, the debate regarding the
degree of distinctness was more even-handed, at least in regard to the
mode of election.93
The Virginia Plan may have successfully secured a foothold
on the issue of bicameralism but not regarding its resolution that the
Senate be elected by the House: the Committee of the Whole’s94 first
encounter with the resolution was to reject it.95 The next week, John
Dickinson returned to the issue, moving that the Senate be elected by

greater where the whole legislative trust is lodged in the hands of one body of men than
where the concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is required in every public act.”); id.
at 387–88 (“Without exerting the means of corruption with equal success on the House of
Representatives, the opposition of that co-equal branch would inevitably defeat [any] attempt
[by the Senate to form a ‘tyrannical aristocracy.’]”).
90
See A CITIZEN OF AMERICA, supra note 58, at 132; THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 379–80
(James Madison); Alexander Hamilton, Speech Regarding the Senate at the New York
Ratifying Convention (June 24, 1788), in 2 DEBATE, supra note 81, at 796 [hereinafter
Hamilton Regarding the Senate].
91
Hamilton Regarding the Senate, supra note 90; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra
note 89, at 382–83 (arguing that the United States must present a “national character” to
foreign nations, which the Senate can provide); THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 391–92 (John
Jay) (considering the Senate an able body for exercising the treaty power).
92
See generally DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 164 (2008) (describing various reasons the United States’ reputation
internationally was at the time “nothing less than atrocious”). Wilson had raised this point
briefly at the Convention. See Notes of James Madison (June 26, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 38, at 426 (arguing that Britain’s refusal to enter into a commercial
treaty with America was evidence of the need for a stable, respectable second branch).
93
Again, many of the distinguishing features between the House and Senate are beyond
the scope of this paper. See supra note 38. Publius engaged in a spirited debate regarding
term length. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at 378–83 and THE
FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 64, at 383–84, 387–90, with BRUTUS VXI, supra note 85, at
444. However, membership numerosity, as we will see, was inextricably intertwined with
mode of election. See infra note 105.
94
See supra note 80.
95
Journal (May 31, 1787), supra note 84, at 46.
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the state legislatures.96 The stances of the Framers can be placed
along a spectrum. On one end, James Wilson was opposed to any
arrangement except popular election for the Senate.97 His two basic
arguments were, first, the people were sovereign, and the government
ought to originate from them directly, and second, creating distinctive
houses would result in “dissensions” between them.98 Surely the
delegates unanimously agreed with Wilson as to people’s sovereignty
(even the monarch-loving Hamilton supported that point99).100 But as
to whether the sovereign people should directly choose both houses,
the delegates were in disagreement. Many supported election by
some different body.101 Some, like Elbridge Gerry, argued that an
indirect election was necessary to temper the people’s volatility.102
And some others, including Dickinson, Roger Sherman, and George
Mason, supported the motion specifically because they advocated

96

Journal (June 7, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 148. Roger
Sherman seconded the motion. Id.
97
Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 151. Wilson ultimately
reconciled with the Committee’s decision on mode of election. See James Wilson, Opening
Address at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), in 1 DEBATE, supra note
58, at 795–96 (arguing that Congress will more adequately represent the people, i.e.,
sovereign, than does Parliament); Wilson’s Response, supra note 88, at 823 (“[T]here are
two sources from which the representation is drawn, though they both ultimately flow from
the people.” (emphasis added)). It is anyone’s guess how he would have viewed the
Seventeenth Amendment.
98
Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 151.
99
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The fabric of the
American empire [i.e. the Constitution] ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF
THE PEOPLE.”).
100
And just as surely did the other delegates (with the exception, perhaps, of Gouverneur
Morris, see Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 151 (seconding
Wilson’s motion)) disagree with Wilson’s caution against “dissensions” between the
branches; indeed, that was the whole point of bicameralism. See Terry Smith, Rediscovering
the Sovereignty of the People: The Case for Senate Districts, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1, 23 (1996)
(“Dissension between the House and the Senate was exactly what the Framers desired.”).
Dickinson’s response is almost comical: “The objection is that [‘]you attempt to unite
distinct Interests[’]—I do not consider this an objection, Safety may flow from this variety of
Interests . . . .” Notes of Rufus King (June 7, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note
38, at 158–59.
101
HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 44 (noting George Read wanted executive appointment and
Hamilton suggested an electoral college with life tenure). Even Madison was open to “other
channel[s].” See Notes of Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 154 (statement of James
Madison).
102
Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), note 38, at 152 (statement of Elbridge Gerry)
(stating that indirect election would result in Senators who could provide a check against the
people). For further development of this theme, see supra Section II.C.
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retaining some form of state representation in Congress.103
Madison’s view fell somewhere in the middle, although he had no
objection to state legislatures on principle;104 his concern for keeping
the Senate body small led him to argue for some other way of
restraining democratic fervor.105
As much as the arguments regarding state legislature election
were balanced and varied, the ultimate vote by the Committee was

103
See, e.g., Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 150 (statement of
John Dickinson). For further development of this theme, see supra Section II.B.
104
See Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 154 (statement of James
Madison) (arguing that the delegates should see if a better option exists). The statement was
likely one of conciliation and compromise; Madison, and many others, believed the states
deserved a majority of the blame for the Confederation’s failings. See STEWART, supra note
77, at 19; THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 46, at 521–22 (accusing the state governments
of “undermin[ing] the foundations of property and credit” and “plant[ing] mutual distrust in
the breast of all classes of citizens.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at 377
(conceding only that state legislature election was “probably the most congenial with the
public opinion”). James Wilson ended up in a bit of a shouting match with John Dickinson
as to whether Wilson hoped to eliminate the states. Compare Notes of James Madison (June
7, 1787), supra note 38, at 152-53 (statement of John Dickinson), with id. at 153 (statement
of James Wilson).
105
See Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 154 (statement of James
Madison); see also Notes of James Madison (May 29, 1787), supra note 78, at 20 (Virginia
Plan) (resolving that the second chamber should be elected by the first). Madison’s
numerosity concerns warrant a brief explanation. Recall that the Virginia Plan included a
resolution that both houses of Congress would have proportional representation (whereas the
sole branch of the Continental Congress had equal representation, ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. V, para. 1). See Notes of James Madison (May 29, 1787),
supra note 78, at 20. As the Committee debated the Senate’s mode of election, the members
viewed the discussion through that lens. Proportional representation, though, forced a tradeoff between a small Senate and election by state legislatures. Notes of James Madison (June
7, 1787), supra note 38, at 152 (editorial insertion by Farrand); see also id. at 151 (statement
of James Madison) (“[I]f the motion (of Mr. Dickenson [sic]) should be agreed to, we must
either depart from the doctrine of proportional representation; or admit into the Senate a very
large number of members.”); Notes of James Madison (June 25, 1787), supra note 41, at 408
(stating that the large states viewed election by state legislatures “as opposed” to
proportional representation). As Charles Pinckney pointed out early in the debate, to allot
Rhode Island, the smallest state, just one Senator would mean a Senate membership that
numbered at least eighty. See Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 150
(statement of John Dickinson). Madison perhaps would have accepted Dickinson’s proposal
if it allowed for a small Senate, but because the sizes and populations of states varied so
much, only equal representation could reconcile state legislative election with a small
Senate. Thus, Madison argued for some other mode. See Notes of James Madison (June 7,
1787), supra note 38, at 154 (statement of James Madison). Interestingly, John Dickinson
not only accepted the trade-off but welcomed it, stating that he hoped for a large Senate,
Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 150 (statement of John
Dickinson), a view not shared by any other delegate.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss2/7

20

Eisinger: Auxiliary Protections

2015

AUXILIARY PROTECTIONS

251

not: Dickinson’s proposal passed unanimously.106 The vote is all the
more remarkable when compared to a fractured vote just the previous
day rejecting a similar proposal to elect the House of Representatives
through state legislatures.107 It’s difficult to know why the vote came
out the way it did. Perhaps (but not likely) the proponents’ arguments
found their mark;108 perhaps the most vocal opponents, Madison and
Wilson,109 were in actuality a small minority; or perhaps (most likely)
the delegates realized that the greater issue by far was the debate over
proportional or equal representation—election by state legislatures
mattered little in comparison.110 Whatever the reason(s) behind it, the
unanimous vote settled the issue with force111: the proposed
106

Journal (June 7, 1787), supra note 96, at 149. The vote is particularly curious because
James Wilson first moved that the question be postponed as the Committee considered his
own proposal for direct election, Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at
151 (statement of James Wilson), yet that measure failed, Journal (June 7, 1787), supra note
96, at 148–49. For reasons we cannot fully know, a large majority of the delegates wanted to
settle the issue right then.
107
Journal (June 6, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 130 (rejecting by
vote of 3-8).
108
The indelible George Mason had the last (powerful) word before the vote. See Notes
of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 155–56 (statement of George Mason).
109
In advocating for ratification of the Constitution, both men eventually found
themselves arguing for the provision. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at 377;
James Wilson, (Nov. 24, 1787), in 1 DEBATE, supra note 97, at 795-96 (referencing Wilson’s
shift in attitude). From the start, Madison’s opposition was subordinate to other concerns
(again, his greater concern was numerosity, see supra note 105 and accompanying text), and
he borrowed Dickinson’s analogy of the solar system—with the states as planets—the very
next day. Compare Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 153
(statement of John Dickinson), with Notes of James Madison (June 8, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 38, at 165 (statement of James Madison).
110
I draw this conclusion from comments made during this debate, see Notes of James
Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 151 (Pierce Butler: declining to give an opinion
until the ratio of representation was determined), but especially those made when senatorial
election was revisited before the Convention, see, e.g., Notes of James Madison (June 25,
1787), supra note 41, at 407 (Madison: moving to postpone decision on the mode of election
and take up the issue of representation in the Senate). The issue of representation in the two
branches later occupied the Convention for several weeks, Notes of James Madison (June
27, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 436 n.2, and nearly ended it, see
generally MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 94
(1913) (quoting Gouverneur Morris as stating, “the fate of America was suspended by a
hair”); STEWART, supra note 77, at 125 (quoting Charles Pinckney as stating, “had the
Convention separated without determining upon a plan, it would have been on this point”).
111
Although Virginia and Pennsylvania reversed their stance after equal representation
was looking more likely, see Notes of James Madison (June 25, 1787), supra note 41, at 408
n.* (inserting a note immediately after recording the vote to explain that the large states
viewed election by state legislatures “as opposed” to proportional representation), the point
still carried by a strong majority (9-2), Journal (June 25, 1787), supra note 80, at 395.
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Constitution upon which the ratifiers deliberated elected its Senators
by state legislatures.112
The ratifiers heard significant discussion regarding the
distinctness of the Senate. Some lamented that the second branch
would not constitute a more direct representation of the people.113
Others understood the need for some removal from the people but
argued that the Convention delegates, in empowering state
legislatures to elect Senators, had overcompensated.114
But proponents of the Constitution prevailed. Wilson found it
particularly necessary to detail the benefits of bicameralism, as some
Pennsylvanians were quite fond of their state’s unicameral
legislature.115 He first responded to critics by reminding them that
both branches “ultimately flow[ed] from the people” and that the
Framers had remembered the people by instituting a popular branch
in the House.116 But setting all that aside, the genius of distinct
bodies was their increased ability to check each other.117 Bills passed
under the influence of a momentary passion, warped prejudice, or the
like “must be submitted to a distinct body,” a body not under those
same influences.118 This check would lead to at least three important
benefits: (1) laws that are sufficiently considered and deliberated, (2)
a more stable body of law because well-considered laws are less
likely to face repeal, and (3) more precise laws, the opposite of which

112

See Virginia M. McInerney, Federalism and the Seventeenth Amendment, 7 J.
CHRISTIAN JURIS. 153, 180 (1988) (“[T]he use of representation provided the means by
which the House and the Senate would check each other.” (emphasis added)).
113
See GEORGE MASON, OBJECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT FORMED BY
THE CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 85, at
11 (criticizing the Senate’s participation in government expenditures despite the fact that
Senators do not represent the people); Centinel I, INDEP. GAZETTEER (Phil.), Oct. 5, 1787,
reprinted in 1 DEBATE, supra note 58, at 61; Cincinattus, Essay IV, N.Y. JOURNAL, Nov. 22,
1787, reprinted in 6 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 18 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981);
Republicus, Essay, KY. GAZETTE (Lexington), Mar. 1, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 68, at 166–67 (arguing that any particular senator will
represent only a small part of that state’s electorate).
114
See Centinel II, FREEMAN’S JOURNAL (Phil.), Oct. 24, 1787, reprinted in 1 DEBATE,
supra note 58, at 86 (“[F]rom their constitution, [Senators] may become so independent of
the people as to be indifferent to its interests . . . .” (emphasis in original)).
115
See A CITIZEN OF AMERICA, supra note 58, at 130 (noting the presence of
bicameralism’s opponents in Pennsylvania).
116
See Wilson’s Response, in 1 DEBATE, supra note 88, at 823–24.
117
Id. at 824.
118
Id.
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can work destruction of the people’s liberties.119 But Wilson’s most
ingenious point, in my view, is his argument from deterrence.
Because each chamber will anticipate the embarrassment from the
other chamber’s rejection of bad bills, “they will act with more
caution” in the first place.120 Distinct bicameralism doesn’t just mean
fewer bad laws; it means fewer bad bills. That is a powerful check.
And it saves money to boot: not only will both houses use time more
efficiently, by focusing on better laws,121 but also the people’s
monitoring costs are reduced by placing the immediate burden on the
other chamber.122
In the press, the Federalist Papers were particularly successful
in arguing that the degree of distinctness was appropriate. On one
occasion, Madison argued that the critics’ assessment, i.e., that the
benefits of direct accountability to the people outweighed the benefits
of such distinct branches, misjudged the value of direct accountability
and so resulted in the wrong conclusion. In fact, he argued, to reduce
accountability, and implement distinct branches, would be a better
protection of the people’s liberties. Madison tipped the scales by
reminding readers of two ingenious points. First, republics inherently
suffer from the agency problem123: “It is a misfortune incident to
republican government . . . that those who administer it may forget
their obligations to their constituents . . . .”124 In its strongest form,
this first point suggests that the very concept of a democratic republic
is an oxymoron—that people must either represent themselves in
government or expect representatives who pursue their own desires.
In a more modest form, this point suggests that there is some limit on
the ability of a representative body to represent accurately the views
of its constituents.125 Attempting to push beyond that limit is fruitless
119

See id.
Id.
121
Wilson’s Response, in 1 DEBATE, supra note 88, at 824.
122
See id. at 823 (stating that the check of bicameralism “operates constantly”). As we
will see, the Framers envisioned the states fulfilling a similar monitoring role. See infra
notes 189–201 and accompanying text.
123
See generally Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Agency Costs, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 39–40 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
124
THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at 378.
125
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 2, at 322 (“A dependence on the people is, no
doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the
necessity of auxiliary precautions.”); see also Wilson’s Response, in 1 DEBATE, supra note
88 (agreeing that constituents restrain their representatives but arguing that bicameralism
120
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and wasteful, but even just nearing the limit incurs increasingly
greater costs. On this point alone, Madison reduced the value of
direct accountability such that some might deem the scales tipped.
But he proceeded to make his second point: The Senate is “a second
branch of the legislative assembly . . . dividing the power with a
first.”126 In other words, one cannot weigh the direct accountability
of the Senate alone. In isolation, the Senate need not be feared
because it possesses only half the legislative power; Congress, on the
other hand, ought to be feared. But Congress, it turns out, is directly
accountable to the people—in the House of Representatives. Thus,
direct accountability is satisfied, and to popularize the Senate will do
nothing to increase that accountability. So rendered, the benefits of a
directly accountable Senate are trivial, heavily outweighed by the
benefits of distinct branches. Madison concluded the argument with
force: “It doubles the security to the people by requiring the
concurrence of two distinct bodies . . . . [I]t must be politic to
distinguish them from each other by every circumstance which will
consist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the
genuine principles of republican government.”127
would be the “most useful restraint”).
126
THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at 378.
127
Id. at 378–79; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 2, at 322 (“The remedy for
[legislatures’ predominance in republican governments] is to divide the legislature into
different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election . . . , as little connected
with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on
the society will admit.”); cf. A CITIZEN OF AMERICA, supra note 58, at 137 (“The proposed
senate in America is constituted on principles more favorable to liberty [than those of
Rome’s senate]: The members are elective, and by the separate legislatures . . . .”); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 60, at 367–68 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that the people could trust the
federal government to regulate its own elections because of the different election modes for
the House, Senate, and President). At the Virginia Convention, Madison made a particular
argument that indicates his strong feelings about distinct branches. Patrick Henry argued
throughout the Convention that the national government would be poised to overthrow the
state governments. See, e.g., Patrick Henry, Speech in Response to Governor Edmond
Randolph (June 7, 1788), in 2 DEBATE, supra note 81, at 635 (arguing that the federal
government could tax the people such that no revenues remained for the states). Madison’s
first retort was the right one: the Senate would rely on state legislatures for their appointment
and so would defend the states’ existence. See James Madison, Speech Regarding Direct
Taxation by the Federal Government (June 11, 1788), in 2 DEBATE, supra note 81, at 658–
59. But his second response exhibited a different logic: “[A coalition of the President,
Senate, and House] could be supposed only from a similarity of the component parts. A
coalition is not likely to take place, because its component parts are heterogeneous in their
nature.” Id. at 659. In other words, setting aside the fact that the states comprised an entire
branch of Congress (which would seem to settle the matter), the houses (and the President)
were so distinct that they would never successfully agree on measures intended to eviscerate
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Hence, the founding generation deliberately determined that
Congress would be divided into two distinct houses, distinguishable
even in their mode of election. In doing so, they laid down a wise
structure that contributed to the protection of liberty for more than a
century.
3.

A Modern Assessment

The Founders’ provision for two distinct Congressional
houses proved to be wise. As Todd Zywicki describes, the senatorial
mode of election created a frustrating obstacle for the special interest
groups, which achieved much easier success in the House.128
Because of the House’s direct connection with the people, an interest
group could provide Representatives with campaign support that
translated directly into votes—an incentive Representatives
responded to.129 But Senators were responsible to a large number of
distinct state legislatures, each of which housed representatives
accountable to their own constituents: the translation of campaign
support into votes was far less direct.130 Accordingly, interest groups
had a much harder time rallying Senate support on their issues of
choice,131 and a multitude of House special interest legislation failed
in the Senate.132 This was bad news for special interest groups, but
great news for liberty. Indeed, Madison had argued that the Framers
had hoped to design a government that obstructed these groups,

the states. Thus, a distinctly divided Congress was unable to encroach on the rights of the
people or the states.
128
See Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the
Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007, 1039–40 (1994); see also POLE, supra note
39, at 170 (“It was structure as much as party or class interest that tended to produce
conservative results in terms of policy.”).
129
See Zywicki, supra note 128, at 1039–40 (“Special-interest legislation frequently
passed the House . . . .”).
130
See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 103 (“[T]he possibility of controlling the Senate through
state campaign donations was somewhat remote. It would have entailed paying the election
expenses of a majority of the legislators in a majority of states.”); Zywicki, supra note 128,
at 1039–40 (referring to the costs of funneling lobbying through state legislatures).
131
See Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the
Seventeenth Amendment and Its Implications for Current Reform Proposals, 45 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 165, 178 (1997) (“[The] costs [of putting together two distinct winning coalitions] will
increase further if the two houses are drawn from different constituencies.”).
132
See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 116; Zywicki, supra note 128, at 1039–40.
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which he called “factions.”133
That Senate lobbying was particularly expensive yielded two
additional benefits. First, because Senate lobbying required a certain
level of expenditure to be successful, no law that yielded benefits less
than that cost was worth an interest group’s time—on a host of
measures, they just stopped trying.134 Such a benefit is an indirect
manifestation of Wilson’s prediction that bicameralism would result
in fewer bad bills.135 Another manifestation, perhaps the more
powerful one yet, is the second benefit: if a bill was not worth the
cost of lobbying the Senate, then the interest group had no reason to
lobby the House either.136
The historical evidence is likely unsurprising to most readers
because the benefits of bicameralism are so intuitive.137 Dividing the
133

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78, 80 (James Madison) (defining a “faction” as a
group of citizens whose interest is adverse to that of the community and arguing that a
government must control factions’ effects).
134
See Zywicki, supra note 128, at 1040 (“[T]he Senate's reluctance to follow the House's
lead in passing redistributive legislation drove down the marginal return of lobbying either
house.”).
135
See supra text accompanying note 120.
136
See Zywicki, supra note 128, at 1040. Needless to say, Representatives were just as
unhappy as the interest groups. See id. at 1041 (noting that, between 1893 and 1911, the
House initiated six proposals to reform the senatorial mode of election).
137
Sanford Levinson is one of a growing number of scholars who argue that party politics
dominates our legislative process to such a degree that unicameralism would provide a better
structure for our legislature. See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S FIFTY-ONE
CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 140–41 (2012).
The general
counterargument regarding parties will be addressed shortly, see infra note 154 and
accompanying text, but Levinson’s specific argument deserves a brief response now. He
bases his contention on two prongs: (1) unicameralism is not significantly less effective than
bicameralism, and (2) bicameralism has become increasingly more costly. See LEVINSON,
supra at 140–41. But neither prong is accurate. Setting aside the deluge of evidence in favor
of bicameralism, see infra notes 128–136, 141–143 and accompanying text, Levinson’s
argument for unicameralism is unfounded. He asserts that there is no evidence that
Nebraska or New Zealand, the two most prominent entities with unicameral legislatures,
suffer from their legislative structure. See LEVINSON, supra, at 140. But in so stating,
Levinson commits the logical fallacy of appealing to ignorance (besides the fact that the
contention seems doubtful, see, e.g., A CITIZEN OF AMERICA, supra note 58, at 133–34
(criticizing specific results from Pennsylvania’s unicameral legislature)). His statement of
bicameralism’s increasing costliness is also flawed. Levinson states, “serious costs [are]
imposed by institutional vetoes that make difficult the passage of what a majority might well
view as ‘necessary’ legislation.” LEVINSON, supra, at 141. His word choice, though,
employs some sleight of hand. No proponent of bicameralism, past or present, has ever
suggested bicameralism is beneficial because it impedes “necessary” legislation. The
argument all along has been that bicameralism impedes (some) “urgent” legislation, thus
allowing time to filter out the “urgent” legislation that turns out not to be “necessary” after
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legislature into chambers, at the least, adds costs to passing
legislation, which will cause factions to think twice about any
particular measure.138 And, as Noah Webster argued, the division
alone will compartmentalize discussion in order to isolate undue
influence in one house or the other.139
And intuition accords with the Founders’ further decision to
make the houses distinctive.
Then-Professor Joseph Story
commented, “[i]f each branch is substantially framed upon the same
plan, the advantages of the division are shadowy and imaginative.”140
Modern-day scholarship justifies Story’s, and the founding
generation’s, intuition. Buchanan and Tullock demonstrate that the
ability of factions to form majority coalitions (through vote-trading
among representatives141) is increasingly difficult because of the
composition of the House and Senate.142 Tsebelis and Money show
both theoretically and empirically that bicameral legislatures are far
superior in preserving the status quo,143 which the Founders designed
to be liberty.
It goes without saying then that the Seventeenth
Amendment’s alteration of senatorial election mode did great damage
to Congress’s internal checks. The precise level of damage would
have been hard to predict because election mode is just one of several
all.
138

See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 235
(1962) (“It is evident that the two-house system will involve considerably higher decisionmaking costs than the single-house system . . . .”); Zywicki, supra note 131, at 170.
139
See A CITIZEN OF AMERICA, supra note 58, at 131–32.
140
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 519
(Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1995); see also id. (“[A] single branch is quite as good as
two, if their composition is the same and their spirits and impulses the same.”). In fact,
Story makes a compelling argument that dividing the legislature into indistinct branches is
worse than leaving the legislature undivided in the first place. See id. at 520. His argument
weighs the costs and benefits: (1) indistinct bicameralism yields no benefits to the cause of
liberty because both houses are so similar that special interest legislation that passes either
house, passes both, but (2) indistinct bicameralism does add costs to passing legislation,
which only serves to obstruct the majority from repealing that same special interest
legislation. See id.; cf. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 138, at 236 (“[U]nless the bases
for representation are significantly different in the two houses, there would seem to be little
excuse for the two-house system.”).
141
See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 138, at 236.
142
See id. at 247–48. They also cite the potential of a Presidential veto, another
institutional choice of the Framers, as a means of further improving the legislature’s ability
to reflect the public will. See id. at 248.
143
GEORGE TSEBELIS & JEANETTE MONEY, BICAMERALISM 216 (1997).
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differentiating characteristics.144 But as it turns out, state legislative
election was the most important by far: “[D]irect election rendered
the Senate less sedate and more closely tied to the people,
synchronizing it with the House and the presidency; in fact, it often
looks much like a smaller version of the House.”145 The great victory
of the Progressive Movement146 single-handedly obliterated an
important protection of liberty.147
In my view, the strongest counterargument to a call for the
Seventeenth Amendment’s repeal is the predominance of political
parties in our legislative system, i.e., that repeal would make no
difference. In an extraordinarily insightful piece, Professors Daryl
Levinson and Richard Pildes argue that the importance of separating
parties has far surpassed that of separating powers.148 Although I do
not find their argument persuasive that separation of powers is now
irrelevant,149 I am persuaded that the influence of parties on
government decisions is significant and growing.150 But even if the
strongest form of their argument were accurate, it would not obviate
the need for repealing the Seventeenth Amendment.
Most
importantly, their thorough research targets the interrelationship
between the executive and legislative branches,151 a relationship
144

See supra note 38.
Sara Brandes Cook & John R. Hibbing, A Not-So Distant Mirror: The 17th Amendment
and Congressional Change, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 845, 852–53 (1997); see also McInerney,
supra note 112, at 177 (“Senators simply do not represent the states.”); Zywicki, supra note
131, at 217 (“Senators now represent a variety of national interest groups—a role identical to
that of House members.”); Zywicki, supra note 28, at 88 (“[S]enators today act all but
identically to House members . . . .”).
146
Zywicki, supra note 128, at 1011 (“[M]any aspects of the Progressive Era, and its later
cousins, the New Deal and Great Society, may not have been possible without the
institutional reform of the direct election of senators.”).
147
See Zywicki, supra note 145, at 89 (“[T]he Seventeenth Amendment substantially
watered down bicameralism as a check on interest-group rent-seeking, laying the foundation
for the modern special-interest state.”). But see Sean M. Theriault & David W. Rohde, The
Gingrich Senators and Party Polarization in the U.S. Senate, 73 J. POL. 1011, 1011 (2011)
(“By virtue of its design and practice over the last 220 years, the Senate has been less likely
to be captured by the trends of the day than the House.”).
148
See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2315–16 (2006).
149
See id. at 2385.
150
See Richard A. Epstein, Why Parties and Powers Both Matter: A Separationist
Response to Levinson and Pildes, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 210, 210 (2006) (“It is futile to argue
that political parties do not influence relations between the legislative and executive
branches.”).
151
See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 148, at 2315.
145
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entirely distinct from that between two chambers of the legislature.152
Indeed, the chambers’ relationship appears to be less defined by party
differences than those of the executive and legislative branches.153
Second, the Seventeenth Amendment increased the power of parties
in electing Senators,154 so repeal ought to reverse that trend in some
measure. Finally, contrary to the authors’ contention,155 separation of
powers can work in tandem with other measures to continue to check
government activity.156
B.

State Representatives

In his famous Federalist Paper Number 39, Madison engaged
some critics of the Constitution who purposely scrutinized the
document under a double standard. These critics, Madison reports,
require that the federal government both represent the American
people as a national republic and preserve the dignity of the states as
a confederacy.157 Yet perhaps because plenty of Americans agreed
with one or the other standard, Madison set out to demonstrate that
the new government would meet both standards—that it was both
“national” and “federal.”158 He then proceeded to describe point after
point in the proposed plan that met one standard or the other or, at
times, both.159 One such point was the curious character of Congress:
the House would derive directly from the people and so was clearly
national, but “[t]he Senate, on the other hand, [would] derive its
powers from the States as political and coequal societies” and so was,

152
See TSEBELIS & MONEY, supra note 143, at 1 (“The existence of a second chamber
appears to have little effect on the relationship between the legislature and the executive.”).
153
See Theriault & Rohde, supra note 147, at 1011.
154
See Bybee, supra note 50, at 551; McInerney, supra note 112, at 171.
155
See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 148, at 2325–26 (summarizing some of Woodrow
Wilson’s critiques of our federal governmental structure).
156
See Epstein, supra note 150, at 212–14 (describing the executive and legislative
branches’ continued need to negotiate and debate the degree to which a particular measure
will go, even if the same party controls and supports the measure generally); see also id. at
216 (“No one can dismiss checks and balances as a nonstarter just because we live in an age
of greater party discipline.”).
157
See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 39, at 242–43.
158
See id. at 246 (concluding the paper by describing the Constitution as both “national”
and “federal”).
159
See, e.g., id. at 243–44 (arguing that the ratification process would be federal because
the people would ratify the Constitution within their respective states).
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according to Madison, clearly federal.160
Madison’s description of the Senate implicates another reason
the Founders thought it beneficial to elect Senators through state
legislatures—the Senate would thereby represent the states. Among
other benefits, the Founders believed that a Senate with states for its
constituents would constitute a tremendous foil for the people’s
representation in the House. This was because the states brought two
advantages to their role as constituents: (1) they have an incredible
ability to gather, process, and act on information about the national
government, and (2) their motive for checking federal overreach is
self-executing.161 Before delving into the historical debates on this
front, and assessing the result, this Section addresses the
Convention’s compromise on state representation.
1.

The Compromise

It would be inaccurate to state that a majority of the
Constitution’s proponents wanted the states to be represented in the
Senate.162 Note the careful wording above that the Founders “thought
it beneficial.” The founding generation recognized advantages to
state representation in the Senate, but many were not happy about
it—indeed, it was the result of compromise.163
160

Id. at 244.
To be clear, my intent is not to debate the intended role of the Senate in the scheme of
federalism. In fact, my intended argument assumes the Senate was to be an instrument of
federalism and then extrapolates from that assumption: if the Senate would naturally defend
states’ prerogatives, this would result in a more divided Congress that was less likely to
trample on citizens’ rights generally. As to the federalism debate, I recommend to the reader
a large body of research from numerous, far more capable scholars. See generally ROSSUM,
supra note 8; Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural
Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1347 (1996) [hereinafter
Amar, Indirect Effects]; Vik D. Amar, The Senate and the Constitution, 97 YALE L.J. 1111
(1988); Bybee, supra note 50; Laura E. Little, An Excursion into the Uncharted Waters of
the Seventeenth Amendment, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 629 (1991); McInerney, supra note 112;
William H. Riker, The Senate and American Federalism, 49 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 452 (1955);
Zywicki, supra note 131; Zywicki, supra note 128; Roger G. Brooks, Comment, Garcia, The
Seventeenth Amendment, and the Role of the Supreme Court in Defending Federalism, 10
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 189 (1987).
162
And yet I would consider it quite accurate to say so for the other subsections of this
Note. A majority of proponents did want a bicameral Congress with distinct houses, see
supra Section II.A, as well as an independent Senate comprised of distinguished Senators,
see infra Section II.C.
163
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at 377–78 (finding no theory to
justify equal representation fully but acknowledging that its inclusion was a compromise to
161
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The Virginia Plan that Edmund Randolph proposed to the
Convention resolved that both branches of Congress would have
proportional representation.164 That resolution was an object of
contention the next day165 (when the Committee of the Whole166
began reviewing the Plan) and continued to be for many weeks
thereafter.167
The tension over state representation was in full swing at the
time the Framers debated the Senate’s mode of election. The very
first comment on Dickinson’s proposal168 was that of Roger Sherman
as he seconded it.169 Sherman argued that allowing the states to
participate in the federal government would thereby increase their
support of it and facilitate harmony between the two.170 Sherman and
others favored preserving some part of the Articles of Confederation,

save the Union). To be clear, election by state legislatures was not the compromise—state
representation was. See id. (referring to the states as parties to the constitution that were
granted an equal share of representation therein). The two are certainly intertwined, but
opponents of state representation had little argument with state legislative election; their
overriding concern was proportional versus equal representation, and any disfavor toward
state legislative election was because of its incompatibility with proportional representation
(and a small Senate). See supra note 105. Two thoughts. First, the compromise does not
taint the arguments of Sections II.A or II.C. Those benefits would have attached to state
legislative election with or without the equal representation compromise, and many
proponents would have argued for state legislative election. Thus, when Publius and others
outlined these virtues, they were not simply making the best of it but arguing with
conviction. Second, the compromise does taint any argument that Senators ought to
represent the states on principle. Instead, my view, as reflected in this section’s thesis, is that
because the Senate would represent the states, see U.S. CONST. art. V (“[N]o State, without
its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”), the Founders set out to
discover the benefits of that compromise—and they were successful (though not convinced
that equal representation was superior). Assuming that same baseline, the benefits discussed
in this section also remain untainted by the compromise from which they stem.
164
Notes of James Madison (May 29, 1787), supra note 78, at 20.
165
See Notes of James Madison (May 30, 1787), supra note 81, at 36–38.
166
See supra note 80.
167
See, e.g., Notes of James Madison (June 15, 1787), supra note 71, at 242 n.*.
168
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
169
See Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 150.
170
Id. The primary purpose of Sherman’s comment was, no doubt, to indicate that state
representation was a requirement if the large states wished the small states to assent to the
formation of this new government. See Notes of James Madison (June 15, 1787), supra note
71, at 242 n.* (indicating that delegates from the small states, including Connecticut—
Sherman’s home state, drafted the New Jersey Plan in response to their disapproval of the
Virginia Plan). Hence, his discussion of “support” refers less to the importance of federal
and state governments’ continued support of each other and more to the initial support of the
states, without which the national government would never be able to form.
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in which only the states were represented.171 On the other hand, some
delegates blamed the states (and a weak Confederation) for the
country’s obvious troubles.172
The ultimate decision on the issue was Benjamin Franklin’s
Great Compromise:173 the states would have equal voting in the
Senate,174 and the House, proportionally represented, would have sole
power to originate money bills.175
The ratifiers’ debate regarding Senators as state
representatives was a peculiar one because the Anti-Federalists, the
largest group of the Constitution’s opponents by far,176 were prostate.177 For that reason, when they spoke about state representation
in the Senate, it was not to criticize the mode of election178 but to
propose ways to increase the states’ power over the Senate.179
171

See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. V, para. 1 (providing for state
legislatures to direct the election of the states’ representatives to the unicameral Continental
Congress).
172
See, e.g., STEWART, supra note 77, at 19 (“For Washington and Madison, the problem
with the Articles was the states.”).
173
See Notes of James Madison (July 5, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38,
at 526 n.*.
174
See Journal (July 7, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 548–49.
175
See Journal (July 6, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 538–39.
Ultimately, the concession amounted to nothing. See, e.g., HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 116
(describing the Senate’s amendment of House-initiated bills to circumvent the restriction).
But it would be inaccurate to say the Federalists got the short end of the stick: most
importantly, they averted disaster and secured a far more nationalistic government than the
Articles of Confederation provided for, but more specifically, the states control over
Senators turned out to be more troublesome than anticipated. See infra notes 344–345 and
accompanying text.
176
See STORING, supra note 27, at 3 (implying that the Anti-Federalists were “those who
opposed the Constitution”).
177
See id. at 15 (characterizing the Anti-Federalists’ position as one that emphasized the
“primacy of the states”); see also, e.g., Federal Farmer XI, supra note 85, at 287 (“In this . . .
[combination of the federal and state governments,] the state governments [are] an essential
part, which ought always to be kept distinctly in view, and preserved . . . .”).
178
See, e.g., Federal Farmer XI, supra note 85, at 288 (stating that one of the “several
advantages” of the Senate was that by “the mode of its appointment, [it] will probably be
influenced to support the state governments”).
179
Perhaps the most common suggestion was the ability to recall Senators. See, e.g.,
Brutus XVI, supra note 85, at 445; Cornelius, Essay, HAMPSHIRE CHRONICLE (n.p.), Dec. 11,
1787, reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 140 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981);
Federal Farmer XI, supra note 85, at 289; Melancton Smith & Alexander Hamilton, Debate
Regarding Rotation in the Senate at the New York Ratifying Convention (June 25, 1788), in
2 DEBATE, supra note 81, at 805, which the Articles of Confederation had included,
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. V, para. 1. And perhaps a close second is to
reduce term length and/or require Senators to rotate out of the position for a few years and
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Madison, Hamilton, and others seized on this alignment of
interests. Although they opposed equal representation on principle,
they accepted the need for the compromise and consistently reminded
the Anti-Federalists that the Senate’s mode of election would protect
the states from desuetude.180
For the purposes of this Note, the correctness of the Founders’
compromise is irrelevant.181 Regardless of whether states as states
deserve a seat in government, the fact is that our Constitution
incorporates that principle in the deepest way.182 With that as a
some number of successive terms. See, e.g., Brutus XVI, supra note 85, at 444–45 (4-year
terms and 3-year rotation after 1 term); Federal Farmer XI, supra note 85, at 288, 290–92 (3or 4-year terms and 2-year rotation after 1 term); Gilbert Livingston, Speech Regarding the
Senate’s Power at the New York Ratifying Convention (June 24, 1788), in 2 DEBATE, supra
note 81, at 791 (6-year rotation after 1 term). Publius explicitly defended the proposed term
length of six years, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 388–89. He also rebutted
calls for rotating the President’s position with several counterarguments, some of which
apply to the case of Senators, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 437–40 (Alexander Hamilton)
(arguing that categorically forbidding reelection reduces incentives for good behavior,
deprives the people of the President’s accumulated experience, etc.).
180
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 76 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The proposed Constitution,
so far from implying an abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent parts of
the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate . . . .”); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at 377 (arguing that state legislature election of Senators
“giv[es] to the State governments such an agency in the formation of the federal government
as must secure the authority of the former”).
181
Plenty of proponents and opponents of the Constitution criticized the theoretical
underpinnings of equal representation. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at
377–78 (proponent); Patrick Henry & James Madison, Debate Regarding Henry’s Main
Objections to the Constitution at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 12, 1788), in 2
DEBATE, supra note 81, at 683-84. And that practice continues today. See, e.g., Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 574, 576 (1964); Misha Tseytlin, The United States Senate and the
Problem of Equal State Suffrage, 94 GEO. L.J. 859, 863–67 (2006) (critiquing the principle
but also citing several other sources that do the same). For myself, I embarked on this
project largely convinced that the sovereign states deserved representation in Congress. See,
e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 574 (“[I]n establishing our type of federalism a group of formerly
independent States bound themselves together under one national government. Admittedly,
the original 13 States surrendered some of their sovereignty in agreeing to join together ‘to
form a more perfect Union.’ ”). However, during the course of my research, the arguments
of some fellow federalists have persuaded me that federalism’s justification lies not in its
protection of states’ rights but the peoples’. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 181 (1992) (O’Connor, J.) (“The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States
for the benefit of the States or state governments as abstract political entities . . . . To the
contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the
protection of individuals.”).
182
Assuming state consent to be an impossibility (as the Framers did), only a new
Constitutional Convention could ever change the Senate’s representative composition. See
U.S. CONST. art. V (“[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage
in the Senate.”)
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baseline, election of Senators by state legislatures is a necessary
(though probably not sufficient) component of state representation.183
And as it turns out, having states for constituents does wonders for
the Senate as a Congressional check.
2.

“A Convenient Link”

Most supporters of senatorial election by state legislatures
argued that the states deserved representation in Congress, but they
also raised other arguments for why state representation would be
beneficial. Dickinson argued that “the sense of the States would be
better collected through their Governments.”184 Although the
delegates did not much debate this assertion, it’s an important one:
Purportedly, the state governments can do a better job of
communicating the people’s needs185 to the federal government than
can the people themselves.
One manifestation of this claim is efficiency. There was no
conceivable way that a Senator could canvass the state in search of
citizens’ opinions. The distance would be too large. Those concerns
have largely diminished in our day with improvements of technology,
but distance wasn’t the only concern. Gathering opinions costs time
and money. Senator’s would need to devote considerable time to the
job they were elected to do—govern—but that left less time for
183

Riker, supra note 161, at 455 (“Election by state legislatures implied accountability to
them.”).
184
Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 150.
185
Couched within Dickinson’s statement is another layer of meaning. He was also trying
to preserve the voice of states as states, thus explaining his reference to the “sense of the
States,” not the “sense of the people of the States.” Id. There is little doubt that he chose
those words carefully. See Notes of James Madison (June 15, 1787), supra note 71, at 242
n.* (stating that the small states refused to yield on equal representation and thus subject
themselves to the large states); John Dickinson, Letters of Fabius, in PAMPHLETS OF THE
CONSTITUTION (P.L. Ford ed., 1788), reprinted in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 appx. A, CCI, at 304 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter 3
FARRAND’S] (reporting that the delegates had agreed “that for the securer preservation of
these [state] sovereignties, they ought to be represented in a body by themselves, and with
equal suffrage”). Indeed, the notes of other delegates use different wording that clarifies
Madison’s recording. See Notes of Rufus King (June 7, 1787), supra note 100, at 158
(“[T]he mind & body of the State as such shd. be represented in the national Legislature.”
(emphasis added)); Notes of Alexander Hamilton (June 7, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 38, at 160 (“[Dickinson] would have the state legislatures elect senators, because
he would bring into the general government the sense of the state Governments . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
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speaking with constituents. And even if, somehow, a Senator could
gather the entire constituency together to discuss an issue, the project
would still be inefficient because of the number of opinions to
process. Here was a chance for state legislatures to help. State
legislators represent far smaller districts, and although their time
includes governing also, they can hear from a greater proportion of
their jurisdiction with less time (by definition). Furthermore, state
legislators need to consolidate those opinions for their own work.
That consolidation provides valuable information that a Senator can
use.
A second manifestation of the claim is refinement. As will be
addressed later in regard to Senators themselves, the Framers
believed it was a representative’s duty to filter through the desires of
constituents and weed out those that were shortsighted and made in
the heat of the moment.186 State legislators could perform that
function at the state level as they gathered constituents’ opinions.
Indeed, the Senator might then engage in a further refinement once
the state legislature communicated its findings.187
The ratifiers also did not much debate Dickinson’s point.
They did, however, pick up on his general proposition that a
centralized state legislature is far better at gathering, processing, and
communicating information than a diffuse body of people. Madison
eloquently referenced this point in writing that the Senate’s mode of
election would “form a convenient link between the two systems.”188
Hamilton discussed the advantage of the states in more detail,
but he focused on the flow of information in the opposite direction.
The states would keep Senators on their toes and fighting for liberty
because the states could detect danger and communicate it to the
186

See infra Section II.C.2.
The ability of state legislatures themselves to be temperate was the subject of some
debate. Dickinson managed to begin the argument about as weakly as possible; he conceded
that the states had engaged in some poor, short-sighted decisions but then argued that only
state representation would prevent the federal government from doing the same. See Notes
of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 153. Madison recognized his advantage
and argued that, as the state legislatures had indeed indulged a great many of the people’s
short-sighted requests, they were likely to promote the same conduct in the national
government. See id. at 154. Thankfully, Elbridge Gerry saved Dickinson’s point by
rejecting the latter’s factual concession: the legislatures had often been against the people’s
shortsighted measures, particularly when they were bicameral and had a more refined second
branch. See id. at 154–55.
188
THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at 377.
187
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people quickly.189 In the penultimate Federalist Paper,190 Hamilton
explained the importance of the Senate’s mode of election to the
states’ information-gathering.
According to him, some Americans objected to granting the
federal government “such large powers” when most people would
live too far from the Capitol to monitor its operation.191 Among other
clever responses,192 Hamilton countered that state governments, in
their role as monitors, would eliminate any alleged effects of
distance.193 He wrote that state officials would serve as “sentinels,”
189

Although he did not touch on the importance of the Senate’s mode of election,
Hamilton described this process forcefully in one of the earlier papers:
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the
State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete
security against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority.
Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses so likely to
escape the penetration of select bodies of men, as of the people at large.
The legislatures will have better means of information. They can
discover the danger at a distance; and possessing all the organs of civil
power and confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a regular
plan of opposition, in which they can combine all the resources of the
community. They can readily communicate with each other in the
different States, and unite their common forces for the protection of their
common liberty.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 26, at
172 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he State legislatures . . . will constantly have their attention
awake to the conduct of the national rulers, and will be ready enough, if anything improper
appears, to sound the alarm to the people . . . .”); Smith & Hamilton, supra note 85, at 767
(referring to the states as “bodies of perpetual observation”). But Hamilton did not explain
at that time what the legislatures’ “means of information” was.
190
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 515–17 (Alexander Hamilton).
191
Id. at 515–16. Hamilton used quotation marks to introduce the objection but stated that
it comes from “objectors,” so he was not likely quoting a particular publication or speaker.
Among others, though, Brutus had pointed to the size of a country as an insurmountable
obstacle in keeping citizens informed about their representatives’ actions and motives (and
his criticisms were published in the New York Journal contemporaneously with the
Federalist Papers’ publication). See Brutus, Essay I, N.Y. Journal, Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted
in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 85, at 371.
192
His immediate response was that the critique proved too much: if distance really limits
government accountability, as argued, then the people should not just withhold “large”
powers—they should withhold all powers, yet most everyone agreed there ought to be some
powers delegated to the Union. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 190, at 516. His
second riposte was that only those living in the immediate vicinity of government can
monitor it directly, so those living away from state capitols face the same problem. See id.
But this large majority of citizens manages just fine: They read the laws and news; they
correspond with their representatives; they communicate with the few citizens that
personally observe the government’s operations. See id.
193
Id.
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that they would be aware of all the national government’s conduct,
and that they would quickly pass along their learning.194 This process
benefits the people because they can continue to focus on their
occupations and families, thus developing and growing America’s
economy and culture. And furthermore, state officials can condense,
summarize, analyze, and explain the data they collect to improve and
ease the people’s understanding.195
But thus far, Hamilton failed to address a glaring flaw in his
theory: assuming, as we must, that the state officials also live at some
distance from the Capitol, he did not yet provide an explanation for
the state officials’ information source. Here, Hamilton shines. “[I]t
will be in [the state governments’] power to adopt and pursue a
regular and effectual system of intelligence.”196 The “intelligence”
and “power” to which Hamilton referred are more than publicly
printed laws, newspapers, or communications from nearby residents
(information sources he listed a few sentences earlier),197 which are
available to the layman.198 Included among the earlier list also are
“correspondences from . . . representatives.” The states, it turns out,
under the Constitution’s prescribed mode of election, have
representatives too—Senators.199
Hamilton’s reference is to
informants.
The state legislatures would be in continual
communication with their Senators; they would require reports; they
would read their representatives’ votes. And Senators, to at least
some degree,200 would be loyal to those legislatures,201 bringing back
194

See id.
Hamilton did not address the obvious risk that state officials will also editorialize the
information for their own benefit. The probable reason for this forbearance is his audience.
Anti-Federalists sang the praises of their state governments, and their bias played right into
Hamilton’s hand. My instinct is that Hamilton viewed the checks of federalism as running in
both directions. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 2, at 323 (“[T]he different
governments will control each other,” such that the federal government would do its own
part to correct misinformation).
196
THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 190, at 516; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at
330 (James Madison) (stating that Congress will be “watched” by “several collateral
legislatures”).
197
THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 190, at 516.
198
Although, as stated, state governments will also have the time, intelligence, and
experience to process and analyze this data for their constituents’ benefit.
199
Id.
200
See infra Section II.C (explaining that the founding generation also intended for
Senators to have a degree of independence).
201
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 296 (James Madison) (arguing that federal government
195
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necessary information for the states’ protection.
3.

A Rivalship of Power

In defending his proposal, Dickinson stumbled upon a second
argument for representing the states in Congress, one that altered the
course of history: “The preservation of the States in a certain degree
of agency is indispensible [sic]. [State legislative election of
Senators] will produce that collision between the different authorities
which should be wished for in order to check each other.”202 In a
word, federalism. Dickinson introduced also the two most important
aspects of the theory. First and foremost, he referred to the states in
their agency role. In its legitimate forms, federalism theory is geared
toward the protection of the freedoms of the people, i.e., the
principals.203 Thus, Dickinson wisely refrained from suggesting that
states (and their leaders) deserved a role in order to protect their own
interests. Second, he described the concept of the vertical levels of
government competing against one another such that each checked
the other to secure the people’s liberties. Dickinson’s proposal,
though, went one step further than simply creating two government
levels—it gave the lower (and in his mind, weaker) level a place in
the upper level where the former could more directly check the
infringements of the latter.204
representatives will be biased toward the states); Samuel Huntington, Governor of
Connecticut, Speech Regarding the Need for a Strong National Government at the
Connecticut Ratifying Convention (Jan. 9, 1788), in 1 DEBATE, supra note 58, at 887 (stating
that his experience with the Continental Congress was strong advocacy for the
representative’s respective state, and that he expected the same for the Constitution’s
Congress). Indeed, Madison expected all Senators to have served in their state’s legislature
and thought some might even serve in both roles concurrently, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 56,
at 348 (James Madison), something the Convention voted not to forbid, Notes of James
Madison (June 26, 1787), supra note 92, at 429.
202
Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 152–53 (statement of John
Dickinson).
203
See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (O’Connor, J.) (“The
Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state
governments as abstract political entities . . . . To the contrary, the Constitution divides
authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.”).
204
George Mason appears to have recognized this unique trait in Dickinson’s argument.
Mason, who had the last (powerful, as usual) word before the Committee voted unanimously
to recommend election of Senators by state legislatures, argued that there was no “better
means” for defending the states against the federal government’s encroachments than
“giving them some share in, or rather to make them a constituent part of, the Natl.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss2/7

38

Eisinger: Auxiliary Protections

2015

AUXILIARY PROTECTIONS

269

Dickinson had no need to explain the state motivations that
would lead to his predicted “collision.” Those who wished to debate
him on this point were more interested in whether the states really
needed protecting,205 or whether the states were actually a trustworthy
check.206 No one told Dickinson that the states would not be
motivated to preserve their power against federal encroachment.207
During the ratification debates, though, proponents were
quick to note the states’ inherent motivations to defend themselves.
Indeed, what the ratifiers noticed was that bicameralism could
harness those motivations, thus, Congress would be less likely to pass
oppressive legislation than with Senators who directly represented the
people.
Hamilton’s most obvious explication of the concept came
during his earlier-mentioned description of the states’ intelligence
network.208 His description of the network itself was already
impressive, but Hamilton took the argument one step further and
showed readers that, from the people’s viewpoint, the system is selfexecuting. Even if the people were to stop pressuring their state
legislators for information, the system “may be relied upon, if it were
only from rivalship of power.”209 In other words, state leaders like
Establishment.” Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 155–56
(statement of George Mason); see also Notes of James Madison (June 25, 1787), supra note
41, at 407 (statement of George Mason) (similar remarks in front of the Convention).
205
See id. See Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 153 (statement
of James Wilson); see also Notes of James Madison (June 21, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 38, at 355–56 (statement of James Wilson) (making a similar argument
when the Convention prepared to vote on the Committee’s recommendation). Hamilton and
Madison agreed wholeheartedly. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 25, at 163–64 (Alexander
Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NOS. 46–47, at 294-308; cf. Notes of James Madison (June 21,
1787), supra note 38, at 357 (statement of James Madison) (arguing that, even if the national
government tends to overpower the state governments, the phenomenon makes no difference
as long as the people are free).
206
After all, the state legislatures had instigated some of the states’ “great evils,”
including paper money schemes. See Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note
38, at 154 (statement of James Madison). Madison’s distaste for the states, however, did not
prevent him from becoming federalism’s most famous advocate. See THE FEDERALIST NO.
51, supra note 2, at 323; THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at 377 (contending that
state legislatures’ election of Senators “giv[es] to the State governments such an agency in
the formation of the federal government as must secure the authority of the former”).
207
See Amar, Indirect Effects, supra note 161, at 1380 (“[T]he Framers counted on [the
selfishness of State legislatures] in the way they devised institutions to protect liberty overall
. . . .”).
208
See supra notes 190–201 and accompanying text.
209
THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 190, at 516–17; see also id. at 516 (arguing that
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power too. They will do all they can to maintain a piece of the pie,
the bigger the better.
Madison made a similar claim in an earlier paper. Objectors
to the Constitution argued that the House of Representatives would
be far too small to be “trusted with so much power.”210 After
demonstrating that the small number of Representatives would soon
become a nonissue,211 Madison went on to suggest that America’s
situation is such that a small number of Representatives will never be
a risk anyway.212 He noted, among other things, “the spirit which
actuates the State legislatures.”213 Elaborating just a few sentences
later, he remarked, “I am unable to conceive that the State
legislatures, which must feel so many motives to watch . . . the federal
legislature, would fail either to detect or to defeat a conspiracy of the
latter against the liberties of their common constituents.”214
Hamilton and Madison’s proposed benefit is a powerful one.
Like Wilson’s bicameralism, which would be “the most useful
restraint upon the legislature, because it operates constantly,”215 the
rivalship of power would motivate the states as constituents to
continually press their Senators for votes that minimized federal
power. And that focus would reduce the opportunity for the federal
government to trample on the rights of the people.

operating the intelligence system will be in a state’s “disposition”); Smith & Hamilton, in 2
DEBATE, supra note 85, at 767 (statement of Alexander Hamilton) (referring to the states as
“perpetual observers”); cf. James Iredell et. al, Debate Regarding Congressional Control of
Elections at the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 25, 1788), in 2 DEBATE, supra
note 81, at 857 (arguing that Congress’s control of elections was not a concern because the
state legislatures would “immediately resent” any abuse). Recognizing the agency problem,
Hamilton later pointed out that, when Senators go astray, the state legislatures can legislate
directly on the national level—through the Amendment process. See THE FEDERALIST NO.
85, supra note 46, at 525–26; see also Oliver Ellsworth, Speech Regarding the Dual
Sovereignty and Taxing Powers of the Federal and State Governments at the Connecticut
Ratifying Convention (Jan. 7, 1788), in 1 DEBATE, supra note 58, at 883–84 (“But perhaps at
some time or other there will be a context, the states may rise against the general
government. If this does take place, if all the states combine, if all oppose, the whole will
not eat up the [page break] members, but the measure which is opposed to the sense of the
people, will prove abortive.”).
210
THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, at 343 (James Madison).
211
Id.
212
Id. at 343–44.
213
Id. at 344.
214
Id. (emphasis added).
215
Wilson’s Response, supra note 88, at 823.
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A Modern Assessment

Both benefits that the founding generation recognized came to
pass. As to the states maintaining an intelligence network, it is clear
that state legislatures required reports from their Senators regarding
voting records, among other things.216 Two factors, though, have
certainly diminished the need for a state’s information-gathering
abilities: technology and the press. The average citizen today can
access a great deal of information about the government, and
although he or she lacks the time or experience to process that
information, certain members of the press have developed such
expertise in politics that they can interpret the information. On the
other hand, this proliferation of information has depersonalized the
relationship entirely. Hamilton envisioned Senators returning home
and personally reporting to state legislatures on what they had seen,
and then the two could plan a response together. With today’s
impersonal network of information, the people do not enjoy that
privilege. Indeed, it would seem Dickinson’s point has become the
more important one in that the state legislatures could provide a
single location for Senators to seek the consolidated opinions of the
people. But, the Seventeenth Amendment succeeded in effecting that
depersonalization.
It also succeeded in stripping the Senate’s constituency of
self-motivated monitoring. The mechanism was certainly working
after the Constitution’s ratification. Indeed, it worked so well that the
states dragged the country into a civil war. Even today, states
continue to monitor the federal government,217 but they have lost
216
See, e.g., 46 CONG. REC. 2244 (1911) (statement of Sen. Elihu Root) (opposing the
Seventeenth Amendment because reporting his actions to laymen would be more difficult
than the current state of affairs—reporting to the state legislatures). Indeed, there is at least
one documented example of a Senator in the first Congress being invited by a state
legislature to appear and explain a particular vote. See Riker, supra note 161, at 457. But
the relevance of that invitation is questionable because he refused to appear, and the state did
not reelect him. See id.
217
Consider, for example, the challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
by twenty-seven states. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
Nonetheless, in a world of public choice theory, Michael Greve and others have mounted a
compelling campaign to demonstrate that the states welcome increased federal power
because it reduces horizontal competition and preserves surplus to distribute among factions.
See, e.g., MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 7–8 (2012); see also Ilya
Somin, Why Repealing the Seventeenth Amendment Won’t Curb Federal Power, 12 ENGAGE
88, 91 (2011), available at www.fed-soc.org/aboutus/DownloadLibrary?id=3670. If one
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their primary outlet for action (instructing Senators). This has
prompted a renewed interest in the Senate’s role in federalism,218 and
many scholars recognize the potential self-motivation that states
would bring to the table as constituents.219 For now, states must
sound the alarm to the people and hope that the people will pressure
their Senators into action. In a perverted reversal of roles, it is no
longer the state as intermediary between the Senator and the people,
but the people as intermediaries between the Senator and the state.
And as has become all too clear, the people rarely have the time,
resources, and knowledge for effective collective action.220
C.

Distinguished and Independent

The word “tyranny” possesses only half the meaning it once
did. Today, when one thinks of tyranny, one thinks of a tyrant. A
Hitler, Julius Caesar, or King George III. A tyrant is a ruler who
exerts dominion over others to diminish their freedom. The founding
generation knew such tyranny all too well. They had lived under the
taxes of King George III; their suffering under his rule had driven
them to sign the Declaration of Independence and separate
themselves from their Mother Country.221 It drove them to war.
But “tyranny” can take another form. “Tyranny” can also
refer to a group. And it need not be a small group, like an oligarchy.
The group can be much larger. In fact, the group could comprise the
majority of the population. And it is this half of the meaning that
many have forgotten—the “tyranny” of the majority.222
carries that theory to its ultimate conclusion, it would suggest that granting states
representation in Congress was actually dangerous to our rights; accordingly, the
Seventeenth Amendment should have increased the protection of our liberties. Yet that
conclusion contradicts Greve’s own view. See, e.g., id. at 181–82 (associating federalism’s
failure with the Progressive and New Deal Movements). Admittedly, though, that
dissonance may have more to do with the Senate’s allotted degree of independence from the
states. See generally Section II.C.2.
218
See Zywicki, supra note 131, at 166-67. For a list of examples, see supra note 161.
219
See, e.g., ROSSUM, supra note 8, at 1–3 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s New
Federalism is in error because federalism depended on state “vigilance” through their
Senators).
220
See Ilya Somin, When Ignorance Isn’t Bliss, in POLICY ANALYSIS 2 (Sept. 22, 2004),
available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa525.pdf.
221
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776) (referring to King George III
as a “Tyrant” who is unfit to rule the American people).
222
The credit for coining the phrase appears to go to Tocqueville. TOCQUEVILLE, supra
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The founders, like most people today, believed
wholeheartedly in majority rule (although they, like us, reasonably
disagreed on what degree of consensus is required, and for what types
of decisions).223 However, the founders, perhaps unlike most people
today, were not fond of democracy.224 They chose to elect Senators
by state legislatures because they believed this would result in (1) a
body of distinguished men225 (2) that was removed enough from the
people (and the states) that it could serve as a check on the
vacillations of democracy. This section recounts the historical
debates regarding each of those points in turn.
1.

Distinguished Men

Returning to Dickinson’s motion before the Committee of the
Whole, we learn that Dickinson quickly explained his proposal for
state legislature election of Senators with “two reasons.”226 The first
focused on the presumed constituency of such elections—it invoked
the states’ information-collecting ability,227 as discussed
previously,228 but the second focused on the elected:
[H]e wished the Senate to consist of the most
distinguished characters, distinguished for their rank
in life and their weight of property, and bearing as
strong a likeness to the British House of Lords as
note 29, at 239–42. But the Framers knew the concept well. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO.
10, supra note 133, at 77 (“[M]easures are too often decided . . . by the superior force of an
interested and overbearing majority.”).
223
See, e.g., Notes of James Madison (Aug. 29, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 449 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter 2 FARRAND’S]
(statement of Charles Pinckney) (proposing that laws relating to the regulation of commerce
require a two-thirds majority of each House).
224
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 133, at 81. Note that those who
subscribe to a distinction between democracy and majority rule do not find a contradiction
therein. See, e.g., TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 29, at 239–42.
225
Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 150 (statement of John
Dickinson). It goes without saying that most people today would find the Framers’ vision
somewhat flawed for its exclusion of women from voting and government leadership.
Although they envisioned Senators as the wisest men among us, our citizenry has long since
learned that the Senate is only wisest when it includes our greatest women as well. The filter
of election by state legislatures is just as compatible with our, more enlightened view as it
was with theirs.
226
See id.
227
See id.
228
See supra notes 189–201 and accompanying text.
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possible; and he thought such characters more likely to
be selected by the State Legislatures, than in any other
mode.229
The reader would not likely be surprised to learn that Dickinson’s
opinion provoked disagreement, but the reader may be surprised to
learn that the point of disagreement had little if anything to do with
the desire for “distinguished characters” and more to do with whether
state legislatures were the right medium for fulfilling that desire.
As to the first point, Dickinson did not explain at the time
why he wished for distinguished Senators, but his colleagues were
quick to expound on that hope.230 Elbridge Gerry231 referred to the
process as a “refinement” and viewed it as a means of separating out
the interests of the landed class with those of the commercial.232 And
in case the implication of protecting the interests of the rich is too
subtle at first, Gerry later clarified that the commercial interest was
synonymous with the “monied interest.”233 With that opinion (which
others shared) out in the open though, we can now view it more
closely. Gerry and others234 recognized that the majority of
229

Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 150 (statement of John
Dickinson).
230
As mentioned, several aspects of the Senate are beyond the scope of this paper,
including membership numerosity. See supra note 38. The debate on keeping the Senate
small, and thus less prone to the volatility of large decision bodies, intertwined with the
debate on electing refined Senators. See, e.g., Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra
note 38, at 151 (statement of James Madison).
231
Gerry ultimately elected not to sign the Constitution. Notes of James Madison (Sept.
17, 1787), in 2 FARRAND’S, supra note 223, at 648–49. Indeed, among other concerns, he
ultimately found the Senate to be too aristocratic. See Notes of James Madison (Aug. 14,
1787), in 2 FARRAND’S, supra note 223, at 285-86. Still, his concern was never specific to
the mode of election but the combination of other factors (e.g., term length and inability for
states to recall senators). See id.
232
Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 152 (statement of Elbridge
Gerry).
233
See id. at 154 (statement of Elbridge Gerry); see also POLE, supra note 39, at 170
(finding the Senate to “subtly incorporate[] undertones of class”).
234
See Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 154 (statement of Roger
Sherman) (agreeing that election by state legislatures was far more likely to produce “fit
men” than direct, popular election in larger districts, per Wilson’s proposal). Oliver
Ellsworth’s support was also strong. Ellsworth actually rejected the notion that state
legislative election of Senators would make Senators any more representative of state
interests (he assumed citizenship was sufficient to engender such representation), yet he
believed that mode necessary because it was more likely to result in wise senators. See
Notes of James Madison (June 25, 1787), supra note 41, at 406 (statement of Oliver
Ellsworth).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss2/7

44

Eisinger: Auxiliary Protections

2015

AUXILIARY PROTECTIONS

275

American citizens were cash-poor and often in debt.235 Accordingly,
the majority, when left to its own devices, would vote to (1)
redistribute wealth, supplementing its lack of cash, and (2) inflate the
currency, easing the ability to repay its debts. 236 The minority of
citizens, who tended to be the wealthier creditors, could not depend
on raw voting power to protect their property. This is not to say that
Gerry and others rejected the concept of majority rule.237 Consider
his exact words: “The elections being carried thro’ this refinement,
will be most likely to provide some check in favor of the commercial
interest agst. the landed . . . .”238 Unless “refinement” is code for
“corruption,” Gerry did not intend to thwart the majority’s will.
Rather, he wanted a refined body to provide a “check,”239 to provide
feedback to the majority on the long-term ramifications of their
proposal and to slow down the process long enough for cool
consideration.240 In regard to inflation, a salient concern due to the
235

See Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 152 (statement of
Elbridge Gerry).
236
See id. at 154–55 (statement of Elbridge Gerry) (distinguishing between the people,
who were in favor of paper money, and the state legislatures, which were against it).
237
Their conception of property rights would probably have considered some laws out of
bounds per se, whether preferred by a majority or not. See Locke, supra note 47, at 163
(arguing that taxes must be authorized by the consent of the majority, or else the sovereign
violates natural laws of property).
238
Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 152 (statement of Elbridge
Gerry).
239
However, Robert Yates’ recollection of Gerry’s speech is somewhat different. Yates
records Gerry’s opining that the election by state legislatures would provide the commercial
interest “better represent[ation].” Notes of Robert Yates (June 7, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S
RECORDS, supra note 38, at 157. The statement is particularly condemning because it does
not refer to representation of the commercial interest’s views or desires but of the interest
itself, which implies a greater proportion of merchant-friendly Senators in the Senate than
merchants in the population. If this was Gerry’s intent, then the foundation for his argument
is much weaker. See Notes of Rufus King (June 7, 1787), supra note 100, at 158 (statement
of James Madison) (arguing that a national government is distinct from a confederation and
must abandon the notion that the Senate represents only the “Wealth of the nation”). To be
fair, though, his concerns about debtors’ shortsightedness were justified—a deadly mob had
recently terrorized his home state in a movement now known as Shays’ Rebellion. See
generally STEWART, supra note 77, at 11–15 (summarizing the Rebellion’s motives and
violence). But distorting the minority’s representation in a proportionally represented body
(which was the proposal on the table at that point, see Notes of James Madison (June 7,
1787), supra note 38, at 151 (statement of James Madison) seems a rough and perverse way
to protect their rights. Our Framers wisely chose a host of sounder structural checks to
accomplish that purpose, including the Presidential veto, judicial review, and super-majority
voting requirements for constitutional amendments.
240
In this, Gerry’s vision was no different from that of James Madison. See Notes of
James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 151 (statement of James Madison)
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states’ paper money rage,241 Gerry likely had in mind a refined Senate
to remind debtors that creditors need a return on investment in real
dollars, and the result of inflation is not cheating debts but higher
interest rates and, if the uncertainty surpasses a certain threshold,
frozen credit markets. In other words, the Senate’s role would be to
engage in a dialogue with the majority to aid in looking past
momentary desires and discovering their true will.242 Otherwise,
Congress would become an instrument of oppression against the
minority.243
Gerry’s sentiments fleshed out Dickinson’s initial reference to
the House of Lords. That body, too, was composed of distinguished
men—specifically the nobility and clergy. These distinct interests
stood as barriers to the ability of the Commons to tax and oppress the
minority at will.244 But the analogy had obvious limits, and it was
left to James Wilson to articulate them: Britain’s government
presupposed certain laws (such as primogeniture), culture, and most
obviously, a nobility.245 To be clear, though, Wilson rejected only
the idea of basing the Senate on an aristocratic constituency; he
readily concurred that Senators ought to be “men of intelligence &
uprightness.”246
(describing the Senate as one that would review proposed laws with “more coolness” than
the House).
241
See id. at 154 (statement of James Madison). See generally STEWART, supra note 77,
at 20–21 (describing the country’s currency problems).
242
See Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 154 (statement of
Elbridge Gerry) (arguing that the legislatures, and thus their elected Senators, are more
restrained by their “sense of character” than are the people).
243
See id. at 152 (statement of Elbridge Gerry).
244
See Notes of Robert Yates (June 7, 1787), supra note 239, at 156–57 (statement of
John Dickinson) (describing the houses of Parliament as “mutual checks on each other,”
which promote the country’s “real happiness and security”).
245
See Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 153 (statement of James
Wilson); see also HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 123 (“The states were left to determine their
own ‘natural aristocracy’ . . . .”); POLE, supra note 39, at 168 (“[T]he [Virginia] senate
lacked a natural constituency; the question could be generalized for America.”).
246
Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 153–54. When the
Convention later debated the Committee’s proposed mode of election, Charles Pinckney
gave a lengthy speech distinguishing between Britain’s need for a House of Lords and
America’s need for a refined Senate. See Notes of James Madison (June 25, 1787), supra
note 41, at 399–404. Oddly, though, it appears that he concluded that speech by
reintroducing a plan, see Notes of Robert Yates (June 25, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS,
supra note 38, at 412 (statement of Charles Pinckney), he had proposed earlier to the
Committee, compare id. (statement of Nathaniel Gorham) (considering Pinckney’s plan
because it departed from proportional representation to a degree), with The Pinckney Plan,
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Nevertheless, Wilson (and Madison) had a yet stronger
argument that state legislative election was unwise. If state
legislatures were guilty of yielding to the people’s temporary fervors,
and subjecting the commercial class to the landed one, then they were
incapable of electing Senators who could constrain those same
fervors.247 As stated, the argument does not demonstrate the
superiority of the people as the electorate, but Madison did so by
making a further factual contention: the legislatures had inflated
paper currency, at times, without the people’s encouragement.248 If
such was the case, then popular election in large districts was the
superior mode.249
The Committee, and later the Convention, sided with
Dickinson and Gerry—election of Senators by state legislatures was
most likely to result in a distinguished, cool-headed second house.
The ratifiers could now debate the topic.
Some opponents of the Constitution were appalled by the
aristocratic nature of the Senate. The Framers had found it easy to
discuss the House of Lords and a potential American analog, but they
belonged to the inner circles that could populate such a house. The
public did not share that background, and Anti-Federalists
sarcastically exposed the Framers’ intent to the public.250 The tactic
reprinted in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 185, appx. D; Notes of James Madison (June
7, 1787), supra note 38, at 155 (statement of Charles Pinckney) (proposing to divide the
Senate into three classes in which the largest was represented by three Senators, the middle
by two, and the smallest by one), which elected Senators by the House of Representatives so
they would be more “permanent & independent,” see id.; The Pinckney Plan, supra, appx. D,
at 596, 605.
247
See Notes of Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 154 (statement of James
Wilson); see also id. (statement of James Madison).
248
See id. at 154 (statement of James Madison). Gerry specifically refuted this factual
claim and contended that, if either side had ever stood against the allure of debasing the
currency, it was those states that had an aristocratic second branch. See id. at 154-55
(statement of Elbridge Gerry).
249
See id. at 154 (statement of James Wilson) (arguing that election by the people in large
districts was “most likely” to elect the most able Senators).
250
See Centinel I, supra note 113, at 60 (supposing that Senators will be “the better sort,
the well born, &c”(emphases removed)); Letter IV from the Federal Farmer to the
Republican (Oct. 12, 1787), in Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of
Government Proposed by the Late Convention; and to Several Essential and Necessary
Alterations in It, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 85, at 249
(same). Interestingly, not all Anti-Federalists focused their efforts on the Senate’s election
mode. In what is now known as the Cornelius Letter, Cornelius argues that the size of the
House’s electoral districts will result in Representatives who favor the merchant class. See
Cornelius, supra note 179, at 143. Senate elections are less troublesome, then, because each
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was fair game, but it raised an interesting quandary: the Framers
needed to convince the people that a significant threat to liberty was
the people themselves—that’s not easy to swallow. Indeed, it was a
smack in the face for a people that through bloodshed had recently
earned the right to govern themselves.
The Constitution’s
proponents’ success depended, in part, on their ability to underscore
the importance and impact of the moment.251 Here was a chance to
show that the American people could unite and make hard choices
that would bless their lives and those of their posterity.252
The opponents’ more principled argument was that mode of
election, combined with other aspects, removed the Senate too far
from the people.253 They argued that the Senate was destined to
become a “permanent aristocracy.”254 If well founded, the concern
was valid.255 Unlike Britain with its House of Lords, and in line with
Wilson’s argument at the Convention,256 America had no nobility to
comprise a permanent, elected body as of right: the people were
state legislator’s district would be much smaller. See Kenyon, supra note 27, at 13.
251
See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 136 (“The notion that every citizen ha[s] an equal, and
thus direct, voice in commanding the government has been the most consistent and perhaps
the strongest force for change in American history . . . . Not since 1787 ha[s] there been a
group of statesmen sufficiently capable of persuading the American people otherwise.”).
252
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, supra note 5, at 33 (“[I]t seems to have been reserved to
the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question,
whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from
reflection and choice . . . .”). See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE 6–7 (1991)
(describing the general difficulty associated with marshaling the people for constitutional
decision-making). Hamilton tried a different tack in a later Paper, in which he treated the
people’s ability to err as common public knowledge, almost as if to persuade those who
disagreed that they had long since lost the argument. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, at 432
(Alexander Hamilton).
253
See Centinel I, supra note 113, at 60–61.
254
Id. at 61 (emphasis removed); see also Kenyon, supra note 27, at 27 (“[M]ost AntiFederalists feared the Senate more than the President . . . .”).
255
Although many Framers had borrowed the House of Lords as a model for the Senate,
few of them supported a permanent Senate. Madison later wrote that such a concept was
“repugnant to the genius of America,” THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 385, and
even Elbridge Gerry eventually became disillusioned with Senators’ term lengths and ability
to serve consecutively for life, see supra note 231. The small group that advocated for a
permanent aristocracy (during “good behavior”) included Alexander Hamilton, see Notes of
James Madison (June 18, 1787), supra note 81, at 291 (statement of Alexander Hamilton),
Charles Pinckney (whose position, again, seemed to contradict a later monologue, see supra
note 246), see Notes of James Madison (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 155 (statement of
Charles Pinckney), and George Read, see Notes of James Madison (June 25, 1787), supra
note 41, at 409 (statement of George Read).
256
See supra notes 245–246 and accompanying text.
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sovereign. Thus, distinguished Senators were only useful to the
degree that they actually refined the majority’s temporary passions
into its true will;257 a totally insulated Senate was far more likely to
replace the will of the majority with its own will.
The objection required significant treatment. First of all, the
objection alleged that the sum of all the Senate’s characteristics
resulted in a permanent aristocracy, so proponents sometimes
defended the propriety of each characteristic separately.258 Second,
the effects of electing Senators by state legislatures are varied and
many (this Note only focuses on the bicameral effects and still only
addresses some), so justifications for the mode of election needed to
be equally so.259 Some of these various arguments were described
earlier among the objections to bicameralism generally,260 and some
have yet to be.261 For now, though, it’s appropriate to review
responses to the objection that “distinguished” Senators, chosen
through state legislative election, would be too far removed from the
people.262
257

I find the argument strongest when limited to the aristocratic minority’s ability to hold
up the majority in passing legislation. Centinel apparently thought the Senate would be able
to go one step further by forcing inferior legislation into law. See Centinel II, supra note
114, at 86. James Wilson responded to this claim with the obvious rejoinder that the House
of Representatives provided a means for the people to check such measures (and the
President’s veto provided a second check). See James Wilson, Speech Regarding Centinel’s
Critiques at a Public Meeting (Oct. 6, 1787), in 1 DEBATE, supra note 58, at 66; cf. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 388 (arguing that, in order for a corrupt Senate to reign
in tyranny, it would need to corrupt also the state legislatures, the House of Representatives,
and the people themselves). Centinel rejected Wilson’s argument because he thought the
House (and President) would be beholden to the power of the Senate and thus an insufficient
check. See Centinel II, supra note 114, at 86–87. The argument is that Congress will rig
elections that result in a House that is indifferent to the people, but this suffers from
circularity in that it assumes an indifferent House that permits the rigging of elections in the
first place. See id.
258
See, e.g., supra note 179 (introducing some literature on the debate over term length
and rotation out of office).
259
As mentioned earlier, one such effect was an augmented federalism, which various
modern-day scholars have addressed, referring to historical debates along the way. See
supra note 161.
260
To review briefly those objections, see supra notes 113–114 and accompanying text,
and to review some of the Federalists’ responses, see supra notes 115–127 and
accompanying text.
261
See infra notes 310–337 and accompanying text.
262
The focus of this Note on bicameralism limits the universe of worthwhile responses.
Note, though, that the founding generation recognized a host of reasons for establishing a
distinguished Senate that reached beyond augmentation of bicameralism, including that
branch’s role in foreign affairs. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 91, at 390

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015

49

Touro Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 2 [2015], Art. 7

280

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 31

Madison provided both a direct and general response.263 His
direct response was that history proved the critics wrong. He referred
critics to the example of Britain.264 The House of Lords also sought a
“distinguished” membership.265 Indeed, the example even stacks the
deck in the objectors’ favor: that House was hereditary, permanent,
and stocked with actual nobility.266 Surely, then, this permanent
aristocracy proved the evils of the proposed Senate.267 In fact, the
result had been exactly the opposite: “Unfortunately, however, for the
anti-federal argument, the British history informs us that this
hereditary assembly has not been able to defend itself against the
continual encroachments of the House of Representatives . . . .”268
The popular branch of Parliament, as the ratifying generation well
knew, had entirely overtaken the power of the Lords.269 Accordingly,
the American Senate, which would temper its desire for
“distinguished” characters with term lengths and actual elections, was
far more likely to be overtaken by the first House than vice versa.
Madison’s general response was a defense of representative
government. He rejected wholesale the notion that representatives’
votes should reflect the outcome of a vote by the entire
constituency.270 Representatives, then, are not simply proxies whose
occupation derives solely from the inefficiencies of referenda. Their
(stating that election by state legislatures will ensure Senators who are “best qualified” for
making treaties).
263
Madison was not the only proponent to rebut the objection. Noah Webster responded
with a mild form of denial. See A CITIZEN OF AMERICA, supra note 58, at 135 (arguing that
the Senate will not be “composed of a different order of men”). To be fair, though, he was
trying to distinguish Senators from Europe’s nobility, see id. at 134–35; Webster earlier
praised the age qualifications and term lengths of Senators because these would lead to wise,
experienced, respectable men who were “not liable to the bias of passions that govern the
young,” id. at 132. Another response of that era praised the Constitution’s focus on a
Senator’s merits—a stark contrast from the focus on parentage and wealth in the House of
Lords. See An American Citizen (Pseudonym for Tench Coxe) II, IND. GAZETTEER (Phil.),
Sept. 28, 1787, reprinted in 1 DEBATE, supra note 58, at 25–26.
264
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 388-89, 91.
265
See id.
266
Id.
267
See id.
268
Id. at 389 (emphasis added).
269
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 388-89, 91; cf. id. at 389–90 (surveying
a few other historical examples in which the popular branch dominated the other).
270
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 133, at 82 ( (“[I]t may well happen that the
public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the
public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose.”).
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purpose instead is to “refine and enlarge the public views.”271 That
is, representatives are to gather the opinions of their constituents, like
a proxy would, but not automatically vote as the majority (or
plurality) of constituents would.272 Rather, they are to “refine” those
views by purging them of biases and prejudices that taint them. And
they are to “enlarge” those views by exposing the long-term and
wide-ranging effects of each. Such a mandate requires wisdom.273 In
later papers, Madison argued that senatorial election by state
legislatures will produce wise Senators.274 And because of their
wisdom, senators present an ideal, specific application of the general
principles of proper representation.275
Madison recognized, though, that a Senator might soon forget
the constituency and prefer his or her own opinion in every case.276
He wrote several counterpoints to assuage that very concern.277 But
the most important response, in my view, derives simply from the
way Madison stated the problem, that these deceivers “first obtain the
suffrages, and then betray the interests of the people.”278 If Senators
obstinately continue to assure constituents that their view is in fact a
more refined one, and the unworthy just need time to recognize that
truth, then their inferiors have the very real ability to remove them
from office by seeking redress from the state legislature.279
271

Id.
Madison later surveyed the reputedly best historical senates and notes that these shared
the legislative power with the people in some direct capacity. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63,
supra note 89, at 386–87. For this reason, he argued, the American Senate, which fully
excluded the people from governing in their collective capacity, will have the “most
advantageous superiority.” Id. at 387. Note, though, that he qualified the contention based
on the country’s size. See id. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 133, at 83–
84 (making his famous argument that a larger country would actually create too diverse a
mix of interests for any one faction to dominate).
273
See id. at 82 (stating that the legislature’s “wisdom may best discern the true interest of
their country”).
274
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 90, at 377 (writing that the mode of election
will “favor[] a select appointment”).
275
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 384 (describing again the refinement
process—this time with the Senators, a “respectable body of citizens,” as the refiners).
276
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 133, at 82; cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, supra
note 252, at 433 (“The representatives of the people, in a popular assembly, seem sometimes
to fancy that they are the people themselves . . . .”).
277
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 133, at 82–84.
278
Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
279
Without doubt, the process is a slow one, but this is by design. The time lag provides
us, the electorate, the chance to consider whether a Senator is being obstinate or wise. See
272
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Beyond his methodical responses to the objection of an
aristocratic Senate, Madison added a novel, positive argument worth
our consideration. The point surfaces during a related argument that
America’s need for respect among foreign nations280 is best met by a
“select” (and stable) Senate designed for that purpose.281 Amidst that
discussion, Madison mentioned that the “select” Senators’ familiarity
with foreign laws and customs will provide an impartial guide
domestically when Congress legislates on tough or novel issues.282
Herein lies a device for protection of the people’s liberty: Senators
chosen by state legislatures will ensure laws that promote the public
good because they will judge those measures against, not only their
own wisdom, but the accumulated wisdom of other nations.283
Madison and his comrades were ultimately successful in
convincing the people of the need for a distinguished Senate that
could refine public views and promote the good of society.

infra Section II.C.2. Until then, an allegedly rogue Senator is, of course, unable to force
personal views into law. See supra note 257. And Madison argues that the size of our
country will lead to few such instances in the first place. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra
note 133, at 82 (arguing that America’s large population entails a larger pool from which to
choose its representatives, which in turn entails “a greater probability of a fit choice”).
280
Although the theme of foreign affairs recurred throughout the debates over the Senate,
see supra notes 91–92, 262 and accompanying text, the arguments justifying America’s need
to establish herself among her foreign peers are beyond the scope of this Note. John Jay, a
legend in the field of foreign relations, addressed this topic early and thoroughly in The
Federalist Papers. See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 2–5 (John Jay).
281
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 382.
282
See id.
283
In the wake of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005), and the backlash against the internationalist perspective in those and similar
cases, see, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Ernesto J. Sanchez, A Case Against Judicial Internationalism, 38
CONN. L. REV. 185, 188–90 (2005); Janella Ragwen, The Propriety of Independently
Referencing International Law, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1407, 1430–34 (2007) (detailing some
of the backlash), perhaps Madison’s comments are controversial. In my view, though,
Madison’s suggestion is significantly distinct from the criticized approach of Roper and its
ilk. First, Madison’s discussion bears no relation to judicial methods; he suggested that a
legislator can benefit from considering the views of other nations before passing laws that
might tread on the rights of the people. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 382.
Second and relatedly, a legislator’s consideration of foreign views only impacts the public if
that consideration results in some form of prospective codification, subject to the
constitutional requirements of bicameralism, presentment, and other requirements. The
argument seems entirely independent of an interpretation process that approaches an already
enacted text and retroactively modifies it to fit perceived contemporary values.
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Independence from the People (and the
States)

The first delegate to criticize John Dickinson’s proposal for
state legislature election of the second branch was Charles
Pinckney.284 From the average reader’s viewpoint, though, his
criticism might seem odd: Pinckney argued that the proposal was
faulty because it would result in too many Senators285 (by his
calculations, at least eighty).286 He neither explained his reasons for
desiring a small Senate, nor even acknowledged the fact that he was
assuming one to be beneficial.287 More odd still is the fact that
Dickinson’s subsequent response, although in disagreement, made no
mention of Pinckney’s point being unfounded or novel;288 and the
next two speakers (Hugh Williamson and Pierce Butler) appear to
agree entirely with Pinckney’s premise.289 It was not until Madison’s
response to Dickinson that the unstated assumptions of the previous
speakers emerged. A small Senate was desirable because it accorded
with the Senate’s purpose—cool deliberation of the people’s often
hasty proposals.290 Through that paradigmatic view of the Senate,
Pinckney’s and so many other comments come into focus.
284
See Notes of James Madison, (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 150 (statement of
Charles Pinckney).
285
As a reminder, the Framers at this point viewed the Senate through the lens of
proportional representation. See supra note 105. Thus, Pinckney began his comment by
positing the minimum possible representation ratio, i.e., the smallest state be represented by
one Senator, and calculated the number of Senators who would then be allotted to the
remaining states based on their populations. See Notes of James Madison, (June 7, 1787),
supra note 38, at 150 (statement of Charles Pinckney).
286
See Notes of James Madison, (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 150 (statement of
Charles Pinckney).
287
See id. It’s possible that Madison’s note-taking is to blame for Pinckney’s laconic
statement. But this seems unlikely considering Yates’ and King’s omission of Pinckney’s
statement entirely. See Notes of Robert Yates (June 7, 1787), supra note 239, at 156; Notes
of Rufus King (June 7, 1787), supra note 100, at 158. Furthermore, even if Madison’s
foreknowledge influenced the terse record, that fact still proves the point that the Framers
understood the Senate to be a small, cool-headed, deliberative check on the larger, more
passionate popular branch.
288
See Notes of James Madison, (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 150 (statement of John
Dickinson).
289
See id. at 150–51 (statement of Hugh Williamson); id. at 151 (statement of Pierce
Butler).
290
See id. (statement of James Madison) (stating that cool deliberation was the “use” of
having a senate in the first place).
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The Convention’s baseline, the Virginia Plan,291 presumed an
independent Senate. It proposed a Senator’s term length in
qualitative terms: “a term sufficient to ensure their independency.”292
Election by state legislatures simply continued the paradigm by
injecting a layer of elections between the people and Senators,
thereby increasing the Senate’s independence. Indeed, Dickinson’s
explanation for his proposal was that it would “check the
Democracy.”293
Apart from Dickinson’s comment and Madison’s explicit
explanation, most Framers seem to have taken it for granted that the
Senate ought to be independent294 and that the mode of election was a
means of establishing that independence. Their debate centered less
on the need for independence and more on the best election mode for
attaining independence. On one end of the spectrum stood Alexander
Hamilton, a staunch critic of democracy.295 He advocated that the
people elect electors to choose their Senators, but that the Senators
serve for life.296 On the other end of the spectrum stood (as always)
James Wilson, refusing to relent on the importance of the people
electing their national leaders.297 But even he acknowledged the need
for a steadier second branch298 and ultimately modified his proposal
so that, as in Hamilton’s proposal, the people elected electors, who in
turn elected Senators.299 In the middle were delegates like Madison,
debating whether a state legislature was the best means of securing
291

See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
Notes of James Madison (May 29, 1787), supra note 78, at 20. It is interesting to note
that the Committee of the Whole debated a number of years for the term but never so much
as proposed that the actual requirement of independency be removed. See Notes of James
Madison (June 12, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 38, at 218–19. It wasn’t
until a few weeks later, after the Convention had settled on a term of six years, that striking
the phrase was agreed upon without debate (though not unanimously). See Notes of James
Madison (June 25, 1787), supra note 41, at 408.
293
Notes of Rufus King (June 7, 1787), supra note 100, at 158.
294
See, e.g., Notes of James Madison, (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 155 (statement of
Charles Pinckney).
295
See, e.g., Notes of James Madison (June 18, 1787), supra note 81, at 291 (statement of
Alexander Hamilton) (predicting that the “evils operating in the States [would] soon cure the
people of their fondness for democracies”).
296
See id.
297
See Notes of Madison, (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 154 (statement of James
Wilson).
298
See id. (advocating popular election because it would yield “upright[]” Senators).
299
See Notes of James Madison (June 25, 1787), supra note 41, at 406 (statement of
James Wilson).
292
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independency. Madison was unconvinced that a constituency of
states would result in an independent Senate when the states
themselves had often indulged in the momentary demands of the
people.300 Pinckney agreed with the benefits of independence301 but
thought election by the House accorded better with first principles.302
And some, like Oliver Ellsworth, were adamant that the state
legislatures would do the job best.303
The debate was largely an empirical one,304 but one can
compare the theories. Utilizing electors might result in more
independent Senators because the electors would have little
anticipated reward for adhering to the people’s wishes.305 Moreover,
the Electoral College would dissolve after the election, leaving the
Senators with no direct constituency to pander to. State legislatures
cannot claim either benefit: (1) the legislators’ career might be on the
line for deviating from the people’s wishes,306 and (2) the legislatures
were in constant existence, enabling them to influence continually the
votes of Senators. But the legislatures, on the other hand, processed
so many popular requests that to think a particular legislator’s career
was determined solely by his or her senatorial vote is incredibly

300

See Notes of Madison, (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 154 (statement of James
Madison). Madison’s arguments were likely slanted by his overwhelming insistence on
proportional representation in both houses of Congress, see supra note 105 and
accompanying text. A few days later, as the Committee debated term lengths, Madison was
happy to point out that Maryland, as opposed to those states that popularly elected their
legislature’s second house, provided a model of “stable & firm Govt.” See Notes of James
Madison (June 12, 1787), supra note 292, at 218–19 (statement of James Madison).
301
See Notes of James Madison (June 25, 1787), supra note 41, at 400 (statement of
Charles Pinckney).
302
See id. at 403 (arguing that a Senate elected by any other means would have no “order”
of society to represent).
303
See Notes of Robert Yates (June 25, 1787), supra note 246, at 414 (statement of Oliver
Ellsworth) (arguing that the states were more competent to choose Senators whose “weight
and wisdom may check the inconsiderate and hasty proceedings of the first branch”).
304
For a brief comparison of the Senate’s independence pre-and post-Seventeenth
Amendment, see infra notes 344–352 and accompanying text.
305
Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 412–13 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that the electors
of the President will be largely immune to corruption, in part, because they are chosen for
the “temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment”). But see Who Are the
Electors?,
NATIONAL ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoralcollege/electors.html (last visited Feb. 3 , 2015) (“Throughout our history as a nation, more
than 99 percent of Electors have voted as pledged.”).
306
Indeed, Madison’s doubts stemmed from evidence of this dependence. See Notes of
James Madison, (June 7, 1787), supra note 38, at 154 (statement of James Madison).
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unlikely.307 Moreover, the benefits of an electoral college are
debatable: (1) electors were to be capable, and presumably wellknown, men in the community,308 which means they had reputations
on the line and could easily submit their loyal voting history as
evidence of their own qualifications for a particular public office, and
(2) the dissolution of the college removed any barrier that
momentarily existed between the Senators and the people.
For a multitude of reasons, the Committee was unanimous
and the Convention largely convinced that electing the Senate by
state legislatures was best.309 The more arduous task of convincing
the people remained, and the people were not as quick to admit the
follies of democracy.
The ratifiers’ debate over an independent Senate, and the
contribution of election by state legislatures to that independence,
included by definition the objection of a too far removed Senate.310
Anti-Federalists were opposed to the lodging of so much power in
such an independent body.311
The Framers had viewed this decision positively (although
they certainly disagreed, at times strongly, about the degree of power
and independence312) and, as mentioned, effectively assumed the
virtues of such an intent;313 proponents of the ultimate proposal now
needed to elaborate on the reasons for strengthening the Senate’s
307
But see HOEBEKE supra note 8, at 109 (reporting that, prior to the Seventeenth
Amendment, state legislature candidates pledged to vote for particular senatorial candidates);
Riker, supra note 161, at 463 (same).
308
Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 305, at 412 (describing presidential electors as
“capable” men).
309
See Journal (June 7, 1787), supra note 96, at 149 (Committee of the Whole’s 11-0
vote); Journal (June 25, 1787), supra note 80, at 395 (Convention’s 9-2 vote).
310
See text accompanying notes 253–257.
311
See Republicus, supra note 113, at 167 (questioning the extensive powers of a body
that is “independent of the people, not in any instance responsible to them”); see also
Centinel I, supra note 113, at 60–61. But see Kenyon, supra note 27, at 27 (reporting that
Anti-Federalists did not propose direct election for the Senate and that many agreed on the
Senate’s stability as a requirement for good government).
The Federal Farmer
acknowledged and praised the cool deliberation that would pervade the Senate due to the
independence derived from its mode of election but advocated for, among other changes, a
reduction in term length to tone down the degree of independence. See Federal Farmer XI,
supra note 85, at 288. Luther Martin actually promoted the independence of the Senate as an
argument for the presidential veto’s dispensability. See Martin, supra note 85, at 53–54.
312
See supra note 231 (noting Elbridge Gerry’s ultimate dissatisfaction with the chosen
degrees of power and independence).
313
See supra text accompanying notes 284–290.
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independence.
Publius did not shrink from taking up the cause, and
Madison’s Federalist Paper No. 63 is the best on-point example of
the Federalist response. The beginning of the Paper enumerates
reasons that people (whether influenced by a temporary democratic
delusion or not) would desire Congress to include a more stable
branch, the most prominent of which is maintaining foreign
relations.314 At the halfway point, though, Madison shifted gears:
“Thus far I have considered the circumstances which point out the
necessity of a well-constructed Senate only as they relate to the
representatives of the people. . . . [S]uch an institution may be
sometimes necessary as a defense to the people against their own
temporary errors and delusions.”315 The statement touched on two
important themes. First, and perhaps most important for overcoming
the barriers a reader would naturally erect at the hint of antidemocratic notions, Madison labels the people’s errors as
“temporary.”316 He did not mean to suggest that the people are in
need of a leader (read: tyrant) to correct their continual errors and
direct their activities. Rather, the image is more like a trusted friend
whom the people empower to provide a sounding board, and even
legislative bottleneck, in the heat of the moment. Second, he
reminded the reader that this structural choice, like all others, is a
“defense” of the people’s natural rights. The majority, of course,
wishes for the defense of their rights, but in a hasty moment they may
at times demand legislation that infringes on the rights of themselves
or others.317 This is not to say that the majority’s will is
314
For more on that discussion, see supra notes 280–283 and accompanying text. The
other general reason in the Paper’s first half is to locate responsibility in a stable branch,
which the people can then hold accountable for bad (or good) decisions. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 383–84.
315
See id. at 384; cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, supra note 252, at 432 (arguing that the
President will be able to promote the “public good” by “withstand[ing the people’s]
temporary delusion[s]).
316
The passage is rife with statements and tones that seek to subdue the defensive reader.
See, e.g., id. (stating that, because readers are not “blinded by prejudice or corrupted by
flattery,” they will not take offense at this necessary safeguard); id. (characterizing the
influences that lead to democratic errors as “irregular passion” or, shifting the blame, “the
artful misrepresentations of interested men”).
317
See id. (stating that “[the people] themselves will afterwards be the most ready to
lament and condemn” the measures they once requested); see also Barry Friedman, The
Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J.
1, 57 (2010) (stating that the Framers instituted bicameralism because Madison recognized
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nonauthoritative;318 rather, it is a reconceptualization of the definition
of “will,” which Madison suggested to be the “cool and deliberate
sense of the community.”319 The Senate’s ability to fill that
institutional role was set forth in a rhetorical question:
In these critical moments, how salutary will be the
interference of some temperate and respectable body
of citizens, in order to check the misguided career and
to suspend the blow meditated by the people against
themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain
their authority over the public mind?320
Democracy provides the guiding principle in that the people are
naturally permitted to rule themselves, but republicanism provides
the operating principle in that the people sometimes need a moment
of pause as they issue rulings. The Senate can provide that moment
of pause, but only if it is sufficiently independent of the people such
that Senators need not fear for their livelihoods (and perhaps more)
while they ask the people to hold off on a particular measure. The
Senate’s independence derives from several measures that led to
Madison’s descriptions of “well-constructed,” “temperate,” and
“respectable,”321 one of which is a barrier between the people and
their Senators, viz. the state legislatures.
Madison later mentioned an actual example of his theory
among the states—the senate of Maryland.322 He praised the lofty
reputation of that state’s Senate and deemed its electoral process a
successful experiment.323 But he omitted the background details,
presumably because his audience knew them. It fell then to Noah
“the problem was the people” (emphasis added)).
318
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 384 (agreeing that a necessary condition
for free government is that the people’s will “ultimately prevail[s] over the views of its
rulers”).
319
Id.
320
Id.; cf. A CITIZEN OF AMERICA, supra note 58, at 131 (praising bicameralism because
either house can check the other if one “should appear to be under any undue influence,
either from passion, obstinacy, jealousy of particular men, attachment to a popular speaker,
or other extraordinary causes”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 133, at 82 (writing that
wise representatives can parse through the people’s “temporary or partial considerations”
and “discern the true interest of their country”).
321
THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 384.
322
See id. at 388–89. For a description of the election process for Maryland’s Senate, see
supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
323
THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 388–89.
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Webster to fill in the context. Webster explained that Maryland’s
senate was largely spared the atrocities of the paper money rage
thanks to its firm, independent Senate.324 The House of Delegates,
Maryland’s popular branch, had passed a measure to issue £500,000
in paper money,325 a law that Webster argued would have collapsed
the economy.326 But the second branch obstructed the bill’s passage:
“The senate, like honest, judicious men, and the protectors of the
interests of the state, firmly resisted the rage, and gave the people
time to cool and to think.”327 In time, the people relented, and the
state was saved.328 Webster’s description aligns perfectly with
Madison’s theory.329 The people, in the heat of the moment,
proposed a measure that was not actually in their best interest. The
Senate, on the other hand, was sufficiently removed from the people
(and elected through a refining process that sought out distinguished
senators) such that it could consider the matter more calmly. Note
their yardstick: “the interests of the state.” These senators did not
prevent a measure to protect selfish interests; they prevented a
measure that would have destroyed the constituency they had
promised to protect. And after the Senate had postponed the bill’s
passage for some time, the heat of the moment passed, and the people
realized their folly.
Having illustrated the checking process, Madison now needed
to respond to the concern that the risks of senatorial independence
would not outweigh the benefits. He first suggested that, based on
the United States’ circumstances, American liberty is more at risk
from “abuses of liberty” than it is from “abuses of power.”330 By
“abuses of liberty,” Madison referred to the democratic evils just
discussed.331 But this answer, as he recognized, is too general332: the
324

See A CITIZEN OF AMERICA, supra note 58, at 133.
Id.
326
See id. (opining that “every shilling of specie would have been driven from circulation,
and most of it from the state,” resulting in a “loss [that] would not have been repaired in
seven years”).
327
Id.
328
See id.
329
Webster goes on to cite Connecticut as a similar example, (A CITIZEN OF AMERICA,
supra note 58, at 133), and to contrast it and Maryland with the lesser examples of
Pennsylvania and the Continental Congress, both unicameral legislatures, see id. at 132–34.
330
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 387–88 (emphases added).
331
See id. at 387 (using the term in response to objections against his recently concluded
discussion of the benefits of an independent Senate).
325
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United States’ circumstances are the key. The United States
Constitution divides the power among so many branches that the
Senate would need to corrupt the state legislatures,333 the House, and
the people themselves to abuse its power successfully.334 This
compartmentalization works to quarantine corruption so the people
can eliminate it. But most importantly of all, the House provides a
proactive check because of its direct connection to the people.335
Even if the Senate were to succeed in usurping power, the House
332

See id. at 387–88.
Throughout the debate on independence, one must keep in mind that nationalists were
just as concerned with state legislatures corrupting their Senators. See, e.g., HOEBEKE, supra
note 8, at 45 (finding evidence that “Senate actions were ideally to be as free from state
coercion as they would be from popular whims”); supra notes 247–249 and accompanying
text (describing Madison’s and Wilson’s objections at the Convention). Proponents of the
Constitution continued to fall back on these arguments while defending Senators’
independence from the states (in addition to the people) through the omission of a recall
despite lengthy terms and the potential for successive reelections. Compare Livingston,
supra note 179, at 791 (proposing among other things, that the state be able to recall their
senators, and that senators only be permitted to serve for six years in any twelve-year
period), Smith & Hamilton, supra note 179, at 803 (statement of Melancton Smith) (“As the
clause now stands, there is no doubt that the senators will hold their office perpetually . . .
.”), and id. at 805 (“When a state sends an agent commissioned to transact any business, or
perform any service, it certainly ought to have a power to recall him.”) with Robert
Livingston, Speech Responding to Gilbert Livingston’s Concerns at the New York Ratifying
Convention (June 24, 1788), in 2 DEBATE, supra note 81, at 792–93 [hereinafter Robert
Livingston] (arguing that because “[t]he state legislatures [are] frequently subject to factious
and irregular passions . . . a senator may be appointed on one day and recalled the next”),
and Smith & Hamilton, supra note 179, at 801–11 (statement of Alexander Hamilton)
(providing examples of state legislatures that had indulged the people’s momentary frenzies
and concluding, “[t]o prevent this, it is necessary that the senate should be so formed, as in
some measure to check the state government”). They argued that Senators, although state
representatives, also represented national concerns to some degree. See A CITIZEN OF
AMERICA, supra note 58, at 139–40 (“A delegate is bound to represent the true local interest
of his constituents . . . but when each provincial interest is thus stated, every member should
act for the aggregate interest of the whole confederacy.” (emphasis in original)); Robert
Livingston, supra, at 792 (“The senate are [sic] indeed designed to represent state
governments; but they are also the representatives of the United States, and are not to consult
the interest of any one state alone . . . .”). See generally ROSSUM, supra note 8, at 95–102
(outlining the rationale for denying states certain powers over Senators); Larry D. Kramer,
Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
215, 224 n.33 (2000). (“The Senate was designed from the start to serve contradictory ends:
to protect state interest, but also to be a republican analogue to the House of Lords and take
the longer, more ‘national’ view of policy.”); Riker, supra note 161, at 457–63 (describing
the inefficacy of instructing senators without a sufficient substitute for recalling them).
334
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 388.
335
See id. at 389 (recounting that the British House of Lords was “crushed by the weight
of the popular branch”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, at 403–04 (Alexander Hamilton)
(listing several counter-powers of the House).
333
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would have the power and the guidance of the people in restoring free
government.336 Thus, the Senate could never become a “permanent
aristocracy.”337
The ratifiers, in a truly extraordinary moment, ultimately
embraced the notion of an independent Senate, elected by state
legislatures. That decision was a great boon to the protection of
American liberties—at least until the people changed their minds.
3.

A Modern Assessment

History vindicates the Framers’ intent. Their choice for state
legislatures to elect senators resulted in the precise outcomes they
hoped for: distinguished Senators coolly deliberating laws in an
independent branch.
The Senate quickly gained a reputation as a chamber for
distinguished men. Recall from earlier the adulation bursting from
Tocqueville in his description of that body.338 Among other terms, he
referred to Senators as “celebrities,”339 for that is what they were.340
But simply to populate a chamber with celebrities does little for the
American people unless those distinguished representatives prove
good governors. It is a different passage from Tocqueville that
336
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89, at 389–90; cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39,
supra note 157, at 242 (explaining how every branch of government is elected by the people
in some way). C.H. Hoebeke argues the point thus:
[I]n the event that the wisdom and probity of the Senate, like all things
mortal, should temporarily subside, it would be checked by a coequal
branch of the legislature, drawn in its immediate respects from an
essentially different constituency. In factious times, ‘the dissimilarity in
the genius of the two bodies,’ each with a reciprocal hold on the other,
reduced the likelihood that the same interests could gain the upper hand
in both houses, and thus monopolize the legislative power for their own
ambitions.
HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 17; see also id. at 128 (“[L]est, in all these electoral intricacies,
the popular will was lost from view, the entire apparatus could be brought to a halt by the
House, whose members answered immediately to the people.”).
337
Compare Centinel I, supra note 113, at 61 with THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 89,
at 389 (“[T]he conclusive evidence resulting from this assemblage of facts [is] that the
federal Senate will never be able to transform itself, by gradual usurpations, into an
independent and aristocratic body . . . .”).
338
See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
339
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 29, at 191.
340
William Riker uses resignation statistics to argue that the prestige of serving as a
Senator grew over time. See Riker, supra note 161, at 462–63.
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captures this point: “[I]t suffices that the popular will pass through
this chosen assembly for it to be worked over in some way, and it
comes out reclothed in more noble and more beautiful forms. The
men so elected . . . represent only the elevated thoughts that are
current in the midst of [the majority of the nation] . . . .”341 Due to
the Senate’s mode of election, as Tocqueville surmised,342 Senators
were the type of refined individuals who would filter out the people’s
momentary passions. Madison’s argument proved right.343
Furthermore, the Senate indeed gained an important degree of
independence such that it could deliberate coolly without immediate
repercussion. The very first Senators debated the weight that
instructions carried and concluded it was very little.344 The states,
realizing that perhaps they ought to have pressed harder for a recall
power during ratification, scrambled to find means of influencing
their Senators.345
That reaction alone suggests the Framers
successfully insulated Senators to some degree.
More historical evidence exists. As C.H. Hoebeke reports,
the Senate became a barrier to even popular legislation.346 House
bills struggled to work themselves through senatorial committees,
and those that did then likely faced a significant amount of debate on
the Senate floor.347 He describes the lengthy period required for the
Senate to agree finally to tariff reform in the decades immediately
preceding the Progressive Movement’s rise.348 As Hoebeke explains,
the Senators were rightly skeptical of calls for tariff reform from
groups that had sung tariffs praises not too many years earlier. 349 The
Senate approached the measure cautiously, and the groups’ zealous
341

TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 29, at 192.
See id.
343
See Zvi S. Rosen, The Irony of Populism: The Republican Shift and the Inevitability of
American Aristocracy, 18 REGENT U. L. REV. 271, 271 (2006) (arguing that the Seventeenth
Amendment’s primary effect was the “diminution of the Senate” as an aristocratic body).
344
See Riker, supra note 161, at 456–57. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Senate was mostly
comprised of Federalists. See id. at 457.
345
See id. (“Republicans and state legislatures alike searched for a better substitute [of
recall than simply refusing to reelect disobedient Senators].”); see also id. at 457–62
(describing the states’ search for a substitute through the late nineteenth century).
346
See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 116.
347
See id.
348
See id. at 117–19 (stating that “[d]uring twenty years of reform discussion, senators
seemed willing to adopt the principle of reduction, except where their own constituents were
concerned”).
349
See id. at 118–19.
342
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“devotion” to the principles of free trade diminished in the
meantime.350 It appears that the Senate did not finally assent to
proposed reforms until the measures commanded an actual majority
of the people.351 It was Noah Webster’s account of the Maryland
Senate352 writ large.
On the other hand, Madison had also argued that the Senate’s
independence would not lead to a usurpation of power.353 For one
thing, Tocqueville himself observed that the people’s control over the
state legislatures provided a satisfactory process for replacing truly
obstinate Senators.354
More importantly, though, laws that
represented the majority’s will (and not democratic passions) always
overcame the Senate’s deliberative process. As Hoebeke reports,
“historians are at a loss to cite a single proposition, supported by
persistent public opinion, which was ultimately defeated at the hands
of the U.S. Senate.”355
The Senate functioned exactly as intended. By retarding the
progress of legislation, Senators were able not only to debate the
virtues of a bill but also provide the American people some time to
reconsider. Thus, the Senate was able to discern, and shape, the
majority’s will. Such a system does not quickly respond to the
volatile wishes of the majority. Indeed, the Seventeenth Amendment
was likely a calculated first volley in the Progressive Movement’s
fight for other governmental reform.356
The democratization of the federal government is now the
status quo. Indeed, society now defines a republic differently than
the Framers did. Whereas the Framers emphasized representatives’
independence and refinement of ideas, most people today think
representatives should simply vote with a majority of their

350

See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 119.
See id. (explaining that the Senate’s shift paralleled the change in opinion of the
manufacturing sector).
352
See supra notes 324–329 and accompanying text.
353
See supra notes 330–337 and accompanying text.
354
See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 29, at 192 (“The Senators . . . do represent the result,
albeit the indirect result, of universal suffrage . . . . [T]hey can always control [a state
legislature’s] choice by giving it new members.”).
355
HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 121.
356
See id. at 110 (describing the Amendment as a “fundamental step” for Progressives);
Zywicki, supra note 128, at 1011 (“[M]any aspects of the Progressive Era . . . may not have
been possible without the institutional reform of the direct election of senators.”).
351
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constituency.357 In the same breath, though, most are surprised to
learn of the federal government’s massive infringement on our
liberties.358 Repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment would increase
the independence of the Senate.359 And that increased independence
would better protect our liberties because it would sharpen the
bicameral nature of Congress.
An important counterargument on this front regards the
practice of the states up until the Seventeenth Amendment’s passage.
As William Riker points out, many states reformed their senatorial
election procedures such that their Senators were effectively elected
by popular vote.360 Indeed, during the first year of direct elections,
all twenty-five Senators facing reelection prevailed.361 Thus, some
scholars argue that repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment would have
only a negligible effect.362 I have two responses. First, several
academics have praised the Senate’s federalism-mindset right up to
the point of amendment.363 Indeed, at the time Congress debated the
Amendment, at least some Senators were still reporting directly to
state legislatures about their voting record.364 Second, the logic of the
357
See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565 (“[R]epresentative government is in essence selfgovernment through the medium of elected representatives of the people . . . .”).
358
See, e.g., Jennifer Stisa Granick & Christopher Jon Sprigman, Op-Ed., The Criminal
N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/opinion/thecriminal-nsa.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& (describing how the government has interfered
into our privacy).
359
Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside
Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1071 n.98 (1988) (“Repeal of the Seventeenth
Amendment might help to . . . enhance national governmental deliberations.”); Cass R.
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 79 (1985) (“[T]he
original constitutional framework was based on an understanding that national
representatives should be largely insulated from constituent pressures. Such insulation, it
was thought, would facilitate the performance of the deliberative functions of government.
That system of insulation has broken down with [, among other things], direct election of
senators . . . .”).
360
See Riker, supra note 161, at 463–67 (describing a progression that led up to the
Oregon Plan and, ultimately, the Seventeenth Amendment).
361
Zywicki, supra note 131, at 189.
362
See, e.g., Amar, Indirect Effects, supra note 161, at 1360 n.51 (“[A]ny repeal of the
Seventeenth Amendment, to be meaningful, would also have to disable States from enacting
versions of the ‘Oregon Plan.’ ”); Somin, supra note 217, at 92 (“[A] straight-up repeal of
the amendment would probably have little effect of any kind, since popular election of
senators would persist in most states even if it were no longer constitutionally mandated.”).
363
See, e.g., ROSSUM, supra note 8, at x (arguing that a Senate elected by state legislatures
would never have enacted the New Deal legislation).
364
See 46 CONG. REC. 2244 (1911) (statement of Sen. Elihu Root).
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response can be reversed: if the Seventeenth Amendment’s repeal
would have no effect, that suggests its passage did not either. But if
that were the case, it leaves unexplained the force behind a
nationwide movement.365 Election by state legislatures must have
been doing its job,366 even if not as purely as in early history of the
Union. And a repeal of the Seventeenth Amendment would return us
to that time when liberties were better protected.
III.

CONCLUSION

In the fervor that led up to the ratification of the Seventeenth
Amendment, proponents of the proposal to directly elect Senators
proffered a host of arguments in support of the change. Each of these
arguments was unsatisfying, but making poor arguments was not the
Progressives’ worst mistake. Their gravest error was to ignore the
specific arguments of the Founders in favor of state legislature
election and to presume themselves more worthy of structuring the
federal government.
This Article has argued that the Founders of our Union
specifically intended for Senators to be elected by state legislatures
because, among other reasons, it would result in a truly bicameral
Congress that was less likely to infringe on the liberties of the people.
Indeed, it was considered by them to be an auxiliary protection for
the people in their relationship with the government.
The
Seventeenth Amendment foolishly overruled that intent. Thus, the
logical outcome of this Article’s argument is that the Seventeenth
Amendment ought to be repealed, and the founding generation’s
intended structure restored.
Unfortunately, the Seventeenth Amendment is itself only one
example of society’s increasing forgetfulness of the Framers’
wisdom. This trend, thankfully, has not reached the point of
conscious disrespect for those great men—our debt to them for the
liberty and freedom we enjoy is immense, and it would be a shame to
ever forget that. For now, the disrespect remains subconscious every
365

See Zywicki, supra note 131, at 193 (“The unsolved puzzle for the advocates of the
Progressive model . . . is to explain why the voters in one state cared how the voters in
another state elected their Senators.”).
366
Indeed, as mentioned above, the Seventeenth Amendment made possible a host of
legislation that followed, see supra note 356 and accompanying text, which indicates the
Senate continued to present a barrier of some type.
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time we fail to accord their decisions due weight.
The Founders faced great challenges in their day. They
fought a war against the most formidable country then on Earth and
won; they studied, pondered, debated, and prayed as they laid out the
design for a united republic, the likes of which the world had never
seen; and they consciously worked to leave behind a world that was
freer, and hence better, than they had found it. It is only because of
their efforts that the United States of America continues to enjoy such
liberty and prosperity today. And for that, they deserve our deepest
respect.
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